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SUMMARY 
 
 
REDD+ pilot project ‘Making REDD+ work for people and forests in Tanzania’ implemented in 
Kilosa district aims to achieve the stated goal by providing financial incentives to community 
forest managers through established payments system also referred to as Tanzania Community 
Carbon Enterprise, based on performance and verified emission reductions from deforestation 
and forest degradation.  
 
The study investigates implementation process of the project. The objectives are tocharacterize 
governance structure that has been established for REDD+, and the costs of establishing it― 
here referred to as transaction costs (TCs).  As such, the study seeks to generate knowledge 
about the costs of establishing REDD+,hence contributing to on-going debate on the REDD+ 
design by focusing on local level costs. Establishing REDD+ implies changes in the governance 
structures of forests, i.e., changes both in actor structures and institutions. Usinggovernance 
structure framework, the study attempts to shed lighton the processes behind such changes in 
Kilosa. Based on qualitative and quantitative data collected using semi-structured interviews and 
focus group discussion methods,with focus on the process of introducing REDD+ in Kilosa; 
identifying actors involved; and changes in actor structures and institutions― and data from 
certified accounts of the project and interviews with accountant as well as the review of relevant 
documents: 
 
The findings reveal that, through the FPIC process villagers consented to implement REDD+. As 
part of the process also each village through electionsformed two committees namely VNRCs 
and VLUCs to represent them in the REDD+ activities. Of the committee members one third are 
women. Following national legal frameworks— through participatory processes of land use 
planning and forests resource assessments, villages established their respective community-
based forest management―i.e., land use plans; forest management plans and associated by-laws 
containing rules and sanctions. Lastly, they established REDD+ by-laws defining rules that will 
govern the distribution of REDD+ benefits. The findings on costs suggest that total TCs of 
establishing the aforementioned governance structure are about USD $ 1,331,281. While TCs 
per hectare of protected forest are estimated at about USD $ 21/ha of total TCs.  In terms of TCs 
per ton of carbon dioxide as expected the results suggest about USD $ 0.4tCO2/ha of total TCs. 
xiv 
 
 
The study concludes that considering the financial projections of the project from the voluntary 
carbon markets, and the current household opportunity cost of shifting cultivation for most 
communities in Kilosa it will be difficult if not impossible for MJUMITACarbon Enterprise as 
self-financed entity to accomplish the stated goal. As such, the study recommends that the stated 
goal be treated as an assumption. The study also recommends that further studies should focus 
on the costs associated with the establishment of the MRV and the decision-making process at 
the district level. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is widely recognized that the forests could play a significant role in the current global 
climate change mitigation agenda. However, global forests estimate suggests that there is an 
alarming loss of forests cover due to widespread deforestation particularly in the tropical 
countries, hence responsible for about 17 % of global greenhouse gas emissions (FAO 2011; 
IPCC 2007). In response, the ongoing international negotiations among the parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), seek to establish 
systems through which developed countries will use to channel financial incentives to 
developing countries able to protect and manage their primary forests (Vatn et al. 2009). The 
underlying assumption is that REDD+ could provide a low-cost mitigation pathway to 
industrialized countries towards their emissions reduction obligations relative to other 
mitigation options (Stern 2007). Moreover, REDD+ proponents maintain that REDD+ has  
potential to provide a window of opportunity to developing countries to achieve the 
overarching goal of sustainable development and poverty eradication, as well as biodiversity 
protection (Karsenty 2008). 
 
Following the decision
1
 of parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) at the Bali, in December 2007―affirming REDD+ as potential part of 
post-2012 global climate change regime, developed countries were encouraged to take 
voluntary initiatives and provide financial and technical support to developing countries in 
order to develop governance structures, which will facilitate the delivery of REDD+ goals 
(UNFCCC 2007). 
 
Since then, as part of ongoing series of negotiations, there have been a number of voluntary 
funding programmes in which developing countries are being supported to develop and 
implement  strategic measures  to address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation 
relevant to their national context, including also monitoring systems for verifications of their 
achievements (Clements 2010). As such, voluntary initiatives such as the Norwegian 
International Climate and Forest , and multilateral arrangements, e.g., the World Bank— 
forest carbon partnership facility (FCPF
2
), and  UN-REDD
3
 programme have been 
                                                     
1
 (Decision 2/CP-13) 
2
 This was also launched during Bali negotiations, and has two mechanisms ―i.e, a readiness 
mechanism to assist developing countries get prepared for REDD+, and carbon finance 
mechanism to pilot incentive payments for REDD+. 
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established to support  readiness activities for REDD+ on the ground (Corbera & Schroeder 
2011; Merger et al. 2012). 
 
Bali decision further call for the parties to the convention to recognize the rights of 
indigenous and local communities when  the REDD+ actions being undertaken (UNFCCC 
2007; UNFCCC 2008). As such, internationally accepted norms
4— have been developed as 
procedural decision- making guidelines to inform REDD+ policy design and  implementation 
processes (Lyster 2011). Specifically, the UN-REDD+ guidelines which form the basis on 
how countries participating in the programme should undertake REDD+ actions on the 
ground (UN-REDD 2011). The guidelines preconditions these countries and other actors 
involved in the REDD+ activities to recognize the principles of free, prior and informed 
consent (FPIC) (UN-REDD 2011). 
 
Tanzania is one of the early pilot countries participating in the UN-REDD+ programme. The 
programme aims to  support  developing countries to get prepared, with a focus on the 
capacity building through training for both the public and civil society organizations involved 
in the REDD+ activities, with a focus on carbon monitoring technologies (Merger et al. 
2012). 
 
Additionally, in 2008, as part of its international climate and forest initiative, the Norwegian 
government signed a bilateral partnership with the Tanzanian government which aims to 
support the Tanzanian government towards its REDD+ strategy development efforts; 
establishment of demonstration activities; carbon account methodologies and capacity 
building (Norwagian Embassy inTanzania 2011). 
 
1.1. Statement of the problem and Rationale 
 
Despite the continued uncertainties about the future international REDD+ architecture, in 
Tanzania the implementation of REDD+ measures through the pilot projects have been 
ongoing since 2009. The purpose of these demonstration activities  have been to inform the 
recent concluded processes of Tanzania National REDD+ strategy development, as well as 
the ongoing international REDD+ negotiations (United Republic of Tanzania 2013). 
 
                                                                                                                                   
3
 This is a collaborative initiative between UN agencies including FAO;UNDP and UNEP known 
as the Nairobi framework 
4
 In REDD+ literature written as social safeguards 
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As part of the Norway-Tanzania partnership mentioned above, the Norwegian government 
through its Embassy in Tanzania has further been supporting the processes of establishing 
nine (9) REDD+ pilot projects, since 2009, with a 5-year budget of NOK 230 million about 
USD $ 41million across Tanzania (Norwagian Embassy inTanzania 2011). One of these 
REDD+ pilot projects is titled “Making REDD and the Carbon Market work for Communities 
and Forest Conservation in Tanzania “led by the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group 
(TFCG) ― a local non-governmental organization. 
 
The project is comprised of two REDD+ pilot projects established in two different ecological 
regions namely: 1) The Kilosa REDD+ pilot project operating in Kilosa district, Morogoro 
region; and 2) The Lindi REDD+ pilot project operating in Lindi rural district, Lindi region. 
The project seeks to reduce carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation by 
providing financial incentives to community forest managers through established payments 
system— also referred to as Tanzania Community Carbon Enterprise based on verified 
results (Tanzania Forest Conservation Group 2009). It is envisaged that, the enterprise will 
have the capacity to aggregate the emissions generated by these communities in ways that are 
consistent with the internationally recognized standards, and sell them through the voluntary 
carbon markets― receive, manage and distribute equitably the accrued REDD+ 
revenues(Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009; Tanzania Forest Conservation Group 
2009). 
 
However, it is argued that for such payments system to deliver REDD+, it will depend on the 
capacity it has in terms of power and resources, and structures facilitating the interactions 
between actors involved. Moreover, how costly the system is to establish and maintain, i.e., 
transaction costs (Vatn et al. 2009; Vatn & Vedeld 2011). While some studies have shed light 
on potential costs of running REDD+ payments system based on existing structures 
e.g.,Viana et al. (2009),thus far, there is little knowledge about the real costs offsetting up 
REDD+ payment systems, partly because those being developed including MJUMITA 
carbon enterprise are still under development. 
 
As Corbera (2012) point out, REDD+ is a global experimental program of performance-based 
system of payments for environmental services (PES) apparently under development at 
global; national; and local levels. While looking at the level of transaction costs for existing 
programs of PES,Wunder et al. (2008) find costs to be in the order of 15-50% of total costs. 
The costs concern both the setting up the governance structures and running them. While 
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Wunder and Albán (2008) and Wunder et al. (2008) emphasize that the former is larger than 
the latter, there are reasons to believe that this depends on the type of governance structure. 
In view of the above observations, this study attempts to address the knowledge gap by 
presenting the real costs of establishing EDD+― using the case of the Kilosa REDD+ pilot 
project, Tanzania. By doing so, the study seeks to contribute to the ongoing debates 
concerning REDD+ design and costs by focusing on local level costs. Moreover, the study 
sets out the baseline for the final part of measuring full costs of establishing the Kilosa 
REDD+ pilot project. 
 
 1.2. Objectives and research questions 
The overall objectives of the thesis were to assess the implementation process of the Kilosa 
REDD+ pilot project and attempt to: 
A. Characterize the type of governance structure that had been established for REDD+ 
within the participating communities in Kilosa; and  
B. Generate knowledge about the level and structure of costs of establishing this 
governance structure. 
In order to assess the processes behind the establishment of such governance structure, the 
following research questions were addressed. Concerning objective (1): 
1) Who were the actors, and what were their responsibilities in the process? 
2) To what extent were the local communities involved in the process? 
3) What type of organizations and institutional structures had been established? 
Regarding the objective (2), the research questions were: 
4) What were the transaction costs by cost function and actors involved? 
5) What were the transaction costs by cost categories and actors involved? 
6) What are the transaction costs per hectare of forest protected, and per ton of reduced 
carbon dioxide as expected? 
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1.2. Delimitation 
The research was undertaken in the Kilosa REDD+ pilot site area, focusing on the transaction 
costs of establishing governance structure for REDD+ within the Kilosa project. The head 
office in Dar es Salaam served as the source of secondary data. While the TFCG/MJUMITA 
REDD+ pilot project encompass also Lindi REDD+ project― it is purposively excluded 
herein.  
1.4. Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is structured as follows. First, I provide a background to the REDD+ in Tanzania 
and the specific pilot studied. Chapter 3 presents theoretical framework guided this study. 
Next, I present the research methods employed; describing research design; sampling 
procedures; instruments used for data collection; data analysis techniques used; and the study 
limitations. Chapter 5 presents the analysis and discussion of the results. Finally, Chapter 6 I 
draw conclusions and offer recommendations. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. The Tanzanian context 
Tanzania is the biggest (land area) country among five states constituting the East African 
Community (i.e. Tanzania; Kenya; Uganda; Rwanda and Burundi) with an area of948 
067km
2
.Tanzania has at present a population of about 42 million people, growing at a rate of 
2.8% per annum with population density of about 50 per/km
2
, which is relatively low 
compared to the countries in the region (Vatn et al. 2009). 
Tanzania is considered as one of the most stable countries in the region if not in the continent, 
and has experienced economic growth in recent years(Norwagian Embassy inTanzania 2011). 
Nevertheless, Tanzania still remains among the least developed countries ranking at 153
th
 out 
of 187 in the world, according to the Human Development Index (UNDP 2012).In terms of 
per capita income, Tanzania is ranking at 199 out of 229 of the world’s economies. The 
country is highly dependent on agriculture and the sector employs about 80% of the work 
force. Agriculture sectorprovides85% of Tanzania’ exports and agricultural commodities 
account for one quarter of the nation’s GDP5. 
In relation to the forest resources, Tanzania has about 35 million ha, of which forest reserves 
make up 16 million ha, national parks comprising about 2 million ha, and the rest 17 million 
ha are general land in reality open access (United Republic of Tanzania 2009). However, 
while Tanzania has very many forest resources—deforestation and forest degradation is 
widespread with the estimated annual deforestation rate of more than 400,000 ha which has 
caused concern (Chiesa et al. 2009; Mwakalobo et al. 2011; United Republic of Tanzania 
2009; Vatn et al. 2009; Zahabu 2008).  
There are both proximate and underlying drivers of deforestation in Tanzania. Proximate 
causes of deforestation and forest degradation include agriculture expansion; wildfires; wood 
extraction, and lack of land use plans, with all three direct causes being at play particularly 
outside reserved forests (Chiesa et al. 2009; Zahabu 2008). The underlying drivers include 
demographic; economic; policy and institutional factors that are frequently 
interacting(Mwakalobo et al. 2011; Vatn et al. 2009). 
                                                     
5
(World Fact Book) 
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2.2. Land and forest policy framework in Tanzania 
 
Tanzania National REDD+ strategy underlines existing measures of participatory forest 
management (PFM) as an entry point of REDD+ in Tanzania (United Republic of Tanzania 
2013).As a result, the core activities of all the REDD+ pilot projects are focused on 
expansion of participatory forest management measures in their respective areas of operation 
across the country. For this reason I intend to review the current PFM related policies and 
legal frameworks in Tanzania, and by doing so I lay the foundation for the understanding the 
institutional structures informing decisions in the implementation processes of the Kilosa 
REDD+ pilot project. In what follows both land and forest tenure systems in Tanzania will be 
presented (subsection 2.2.1). Next, a discussion of REDD+ in Tanzania including the 
REDD+ pilot project will follow (section 2.2.2). 
 
2.2.1. Land tenure in Tanzania 
 
Tenure security is critical for REDD+ implementation on the ground (Corbera 2005; Leggett 
& Lovell 2012; Lorenzo & James 2009). This is so, particularly for the communities under 
the MJUMITA carbon cooperative that will act as service providers, thus unless they have 
clear and defined rights or user rights over the land where the service is based, there are 
growing concerns that they may not benefit from the REDD+ (Campese 2011). 
 
Veit et al. (2012) defines land tenure as the set of institutions and policies that determine how 
the land and its resources are accessed; who can hold and use these resources; and for how 
long and under what conditions they may be used. Veit et al. point out that, the form of land 
tenure concern the rules and norms associated with any number of entities such as: 
individual; a public/state; a common-property arrangements and so on. 
 
In Tanzania, the current land Act of 1999 is the basic law in relation to land other than the 
village land— i.e., the management of land, settlement of disputes and related issues. The 
village land Act of 1999 provides legal framework for the management and administration of 
village land, and for associated issues. These Acts support the current national land policy of 
1995,which according to the Tanzanian government aims to promote an equitable distribution 
of, and access to, land by all Tanzanian citizens(United Republic of Tanzania 1995).  
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It is further emphasized that, the current land policy  aims to streamline the institutional 
arrangements in land administration and land dispute resolution, as well as protecting land 
resources from degradation, thus for sustainable development(United Republic of Tanzania 
2009). 
 
There are three main land categories in Tanzania: 
 
1) Reserved land includes designated areas (public land) such as game reserves; forest 
reserve; and national parks etc. Taken together they form about 30-40% of Tanzania’s 
total area and they are governed by the land Act. 
2) Village land, is the land which have been surveyed and registered under the 
provisions of the village land Act of 1999 (United Republic of Tanzania 1999)with 
the village council as managers. 
3) General land, which consists of all land that is neither village land nor reserved land, 
i.e., in reality it is land under open access.  
     Both reserved and general land falls under the authority of the Commissioner for land with 
power to administer them on behalf of the President. It is should be noted, legally, all land in 
Tanzania is public land and remains vested in the President for and in trust of all Tanzanians, 
both the present and the future generations (United Republic of Tanzania 2009). In the 
context of REDD+, however, the REDD+ framework document highlight that, a significant 
number of village lands are not yet formally registered, implying that their land are 
categorized as general land, thus insecure tenure for villagers. 
     It is argued that, land Act and subsequent village land regulations of 2001provides guidelines 
for which village land registration process must follow, including surveying village land; 
preparation of village land use plans and by-laws, and consequently their formalization (Wily 
2003). According to the REDD+ framework, the registration of land is the responsibility of 
the commissioner for lands, as mentioned he is the principle administrator of the land 
Act(United Republic of Tanzania 2009).  
      As Wily (2003) asserts the commissioner for lands is very powerful person, he handles all 
issues over land in Tanzania, for instance under section 12 (1) the Minister of lands is 
required to establish the land allocation committees across levels of government to advise the 
Commissioner on decisions over all applications for right of occupancy. In the following 
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Subsection, I will provide an overview of the relationship of land tenure and forest use and 
management in Tanzania mainland. 
     2.2.2. Governance of forest resources in Tanzania 
Tanzania forestry policy, as in most other developing countries, has been influenced by the 
international forestry policy debates. Since the1990s, Tanzania introduced decentralization 
policies which sought to shift from ‘command and control’ approach to participatory form of 
management as a way to involve local communities in the decision-making of sustainable use 
and conservation of land-based natural resources and management of environment 
(Mwakalobo et al. 2011).  
 
As a result, participatory forest management (PFM) approaches emerged as key strategies for 
the forests management in Tanzania, thus supported by a set of policies; laws and regulations, 
including the national forest policy of 1998;the accompanied forest Act of2002; the local 
government Act of 1982 and the national forest programme (NFP) of 2001 among others 
(United Republic of Tanzania 1998; United Republic of Tanzania 2001; United Republic of 
Tanzania 2002). In the light of REDD+, Tanzanian government asserts that the 
implementation of REDD+ strategy will be done within the existing forestry policy 
framework, i.e., which support participatory forest management strategies, it is stated that, 
“Tanzania is putting efforts in addressing drivers of deforestation and forest degradation 
through adoption of legal framework that promotes PFM approaches” (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2013). 
 
The forest Act of 2002 provides the following forest categories:  
a) National forests reserves― i.e., public forests which comprised of natural forests 
designated as national forest reserves and forests on general land. 
b) Local authority forest reserves which comprised of both local authority forest 
reserves and forests on general land. 
c) Village forests encompass village land forest reserves and community forest 
reserves created out of village forests, and 
d) Private forests which encompass the forests on village land held by one or more 
individuals under a customary right of occupancy; and forests on general land or 
village land of which the rights of occupancy or lease has been granted to an 
individual or individuals― NGOs or corporate entity for the purpose agreed 
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between the right holder and the granting authority as required by forest Act 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2002). 
 
There two forms of participatory forest management (PFM) practiced in Tanzania: 1) The 
community-based forest management (CBFM)— which takes place in forests on general 
land, i.e. After the forest land have been surveyed and demarcated, and subsequently 
formalized— through drafting  village forest management plans and by-laws of the proposed 
village forest reserves. 
 
It is argued that, once the district council approves the forest management plans and by-laws, 
the demarcated forest land is declared as village land forest reserve (VLFR), registered or 
formalize by the  district council (Blomley et al. 2008). On the basis of this legal transfer of 
rights and responsibilities to the village government ― villagers can harvest the forest 
products including timber and poles; collect and retain forest royalties, and undertake patrols 
(ibid). As such, the role of district authorities is limited to the monitoring compliance of the 
forest management plans (United Republic of Tanzania 2006). 
 
The second form of participatory forest management is the joint forest management (JFM), 
which takes place on state owned forests such as national forest reserves (NFRs). With JFM 
the forest owner― that is, the central/ local government enter into agreement with the local 
communities living adjacent to the forest to share management responsibilities, and in return 
they get user rights and access to some forest products and services while the forest 
ownership remain with the owner (Mwakalobo et al. 2011).It is important to note that, joint 
forest management (JFM) has been officially endorsed as the most preferred approach by the 
Tanzanian government, when it comes to the implementation of  the REDD+ strategy plans 
on the ground(United Republic of Tanzania 2013).  
 
The role of participatory forest management strategy and its impact on sustainable use and  
management of Tanzania forests is documented by many (Alden Wily 1997; Blomley 2006; 
Blomley et al. 2010; Kajembe et al. 2009; Zahabu 2008).These studies and many others 
suggest that, where participatory forest management (PFM) has been practiced; forests have 
remarkably been recovered due to improved management as a result of secured tenure.  
The held view is that FM strategy has been effective in realizing its stated objectives namely: 
(1) improved forest quality through sustainable management practices; (2) improved 
livelihoods through increased forest revenues and secure supply of subsistence forest 
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products, and (3) improved forest governance at village and district levels through effective 
and accountable natural resource management organizations(Blomley & Ramadhani 2006; 
Kajembe et al. 2009).However, according to the Tanzanian government only 4 million 
hectares (i.e., less than 14 % of 35 million hectares of mainland Tanzania forests area) are 
estimated to be under PFM.  
 
The Tanzanian government attributes this low coverage and slow speed to the limited 
resources in terms of funds and knowhow (lack of skilled personnel). For this, as the 
Tanzanian government vision towards REDD+ it states that, “Access to REDD+ finances 
through fund based financing arrangement could facilitate and speed up this process and 
possibly reduce the high levels of deforestation and forest degradation. The government of 
Tanzania considers the REDD+ policy a viable option for providing opportunities for the 
country to meet it is obligation of managing her forest and woodlands on a sustainable basis 
and at the same time responding to poverty reduction initiative accordingly” (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2013, p.). 
 
Furthermore, the Tanzanian government in line with participatory forest management lays 
down its strategic action plans for effective emission reductions from deforestation and forest 
degradation that will be undertaken through the national forest programme under the 
coordination of the newly established national forest service (NFS): 
- To establish proper land use plans on both the protective and productive village 
forests 
- To develop sustainable harvesting plans for productive village forests 
- To establish management institutions including forest management plans and by-laws 
for village forest reserves; and  
- To promote good governance across levels.  
As alluded to earlier, the national forest programme was established, in 2001,as a 10-year 
strategic framework for the implementation of both the forest policy of 1998 and the forest 
Act of 2002, through broader strategic activities including PFM development (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2001).Hence, National forest programme provides guidance in which 
PFM should be undertaken in Tanzania, Table 1 below show the conditions necessary for the 
communities to establish a community-based forest management over the forests on general 
land (ibid). 
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Table 1: National PFM guidelines 
 
Stage One : Getting started 
 District level : select the villages for PFM, brief district staff, create a District PFM facilitation team 
 Village level: District PFM team meet Village Council and Village Assembly and establish a Village 
Natural Resource Committee (VNRC) 
Stage Two: Assessment and Management Planning 
 Identify and agree on the boundaries of the village and village forest reserve 
 Carry out a Participatory Forest Resource Assessment with the VNRC, and measure and assess the 
forest and consult stakeholders and natural resource users 
 Develop a village management plan and village by-laws draft 
Stage Three: Formalizing and Legalizing 
 VNRC presents the draft to the Village Council and Assembly for Approval 
 Village chairman takes the draft to the Ward development committee 
 The ward development committee inform the neighboring villages in ward about the location and 
rules of the new village forest reserve 
 Together with the district PFM team the VNRC takes the draft to the District Council for final 
approval 
Stage Four: Implementing 
 Awareness raising among village members concerning the management plan and by-laws 
 Strengthen the VNRC and its ability to hold meetings, undertake patrols, perform record-keeping and 
monitoring of the forest, and methods to deal with forest encroachment 
 Starting afforestation activities if there are any 
 District monitoring and supervising and acting as conflict resolution if necessary 
Stage Five: Revising and gazette 
 Three years after implementation the forest management plan is reviewed and revised if necessary 
 If villages want their VLFR be gazette, they can submit an official request to the FBD 
Stage Six: Expanding to new areas 
 CBFM villagers can expand their VFR if they want, i.e., they can include more general forest land to 
village land forest reserve.  
 Neighboring villagers can expand their VFR if they want 
 Neighboring villages or others in the district can request CBFM 
If so priorities needs to be balanced; action plan created, an administrative framework and support system set 
up and a budget set. 
 
Source: (MNRT- FBD 2007, cited in Dyngeland & Eriksson 2011, p.95) 
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2.3. REDD+ in Tanzania 
 
This section provides a brief overview of REDD+ introduction in Tanzania, before I turn to 
the TFCG/MJUMITAREDD+ pilot project. 
 
As mentioned earlier, in 2008, the Norwegian government and Tanzanian government signed 
a letter of intent expressing commitment to form a strategic partnership on climate change 
issues. As a result of this commitment, in 2009, both governments signed further a 4-year 
(2009-2013) bilateral agreement worth of NOK 40 million equivalent to approximately USD 
$ 71 million―as a financial support towards the development of Tanzania national REDD+ 
strategy (Norwagian Embassy inTanzania 2011). 
 
Accordingly, Tanzanian government started this process by appointing a special committee 
known as National REDD+ Task Force committee to oversee the REDD+ strategy 
development process, with representation drawn from mainly public agencies, including the 
Vice president’s office; Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism; Zanzibar government; 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, Ministry of Energy and Minerals; 
Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Regional Administration and Local government; Ministry of 
Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development; Ministry of Community development, 
Gender and Children.  
 
The government also designated institute of resource assessment (IRA) of the University of 
Dar es Salaam, as a secretariat to the National REDD+ task force committee to coordinate the 
work of the committee (United Republic of Tanzania 2009). 
 
In 2009, the Tanzanian government published its national REDD+ framework to guide, the 
processes of the strategy development. According to the framework document, its preparation 
process involved extensive consultative meetings with all stakeholders across the country 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2009). Moreover, as part of the aforementioned agreement the 
REDD+ secretariat was tasked to carry out a selection process of civil society organizations 
(NGOs) to participate in the process of the National REDD+ strategy development through 
undertaking demonstration activities in order to generate knowledge and inform the ongoing 
REDD+ design debates both at national and international levels (United Republic of Tanzania 
2009, p.34). 
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In December 2010, the Tanzanian government released a draft of its national REDD+ 
strategy to the public debate— as the draft document put it, “This draft Strategy has been 
produced for stakeholders’ consultation and engagement for its consolidation” (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2010, p. 6). 
 
In February 2013, the Tanzanian government published its final version of the REDD+ 
strategy implementation. According to United Republic of Tanzania (2013) its National 
REDD+ strategy aims “to facilitate well-coordinated and effective implementation of 
REDD+ related policies, processes and activities so as to contribute to climate change 
agenda and overall sustainable human development, enabling Tanzania to benefit from a 
system based on result-based payments for demonstrated emission reductions from 
deforestation and forest degradation” (ibid, p.8).  
 
The government further highlights that— objectively the strategy “envisages to guide the 
coordination and implementation of mechanisms required for Tanzania to benefit from a 
post-2012 internationally approved system for forest carbon trading, based on demonstrated 
emission reductions from deforestation and forest degradation and other aspects of 
REDD+”( ibid).As such, the government spells out the core strategic interventions or action 
plans as under:  
1) To develop robust reference levels and an effective MRV system for determining 
forest carbon changes. 
2) To establish an equitable and transparent REDD+ financial mechanism and running 
incentive schemes. 
3) To engage and enhance active participation of the stakeholders in REDD+ processes. 
4) To strengthen a national system for governance and coordination of REDD+ 
processes. 
5) To develop the capacity in terms of training as well as develop infrastructure, systems 
and equipment to support the implementation of the REDD+ policy 
6) To generate knowledge and promote scientific understanding on the REDD+ issues 
through research. 
7) To strengthen public awareness, communication and information sharing systems on 
the REDD+ issues. 
8) To strengthen mechanisms to address drivers of deforestation and forest degradation 
in various agro-ecological zones, and finally 
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9) Ensure that gender is mainstreamed in the implementation of the REDD+ process and 
action plan. 
 
Furthermore, REDD+ strategy document unveils national governance structure for the 
implementation of the above strategic plans. At national level, the Tanzanian government has 
established two committees with mandate to guide the implementation of REDD+ activities 
in the country. The first committee is an inter-ministerial committee known as National 
Climate Change Steering Committee (NCCSC), which is made up of technocrats (PSs) from 
relevant sector ministries and agencies of the government, including the V/President office 
in-charge of environment for mainland Tanzania; the 1
st
 President Office in-charge of 
environment for Zanzibar (United Republic of Tanzania 2013). The second committee is 
named as National Climate Change Technical Committee (NCCTC), which comprised of 
Directors of the Ministries represented in the NCCSC committee, including also 
representatives from Civil Society Organizations; private sector; and higher learning and 
research institutions (ibid).  
Additionally, Tanzanian government aims also to establish a National REDD+ Fund which 
will receive and distribute REDD+ funds to various stakeholders on the basis of their efforts 
coordinated by established National Carbon Monitoring Center (NCMC)―which will 
provide MRV technical services to various stakeholders involved in the REDD+ activities 
throughout the country (United Republic of Tanzania 2013). 
It is further indicated that, the implementation and coordination of REDD+ activities at sub-
national level will follow the existing local government structures, i.e., regional 
administrative secretary will serve as the link between the ministries and the district councils 
in their respective regions. Moreover, REDD+ activities at the district and municipal levels 
will be the responsibility of the environmental management committees in their respective 
districts and municipalities. With regard to institutional framework, the government 
highlights that it aims to reform and harmonize the existing forest related institutional 
frameworks, including not least the environmental management Act (2004); the forest Act 
(2002); the beekeeping Act (2002); the wildlife Act (2009); the land Act (1999); and village 
land Act (1999).  
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2.4. TFCG/REDD+ pilot project and Context 
 
This section provides general descriptions of TFCG/MJUMITA REDD+ pilot project. For 
specificities of the study area― i.e., the Kilosa REDD+ pilot site see Chapter 5. 
As mentioned earlier, as part of Tanzania National REDD+ strategy development process, in 
August 2009, TFCG signed a 5-year contract (2009-2014) with the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs through its Embassy in Dar es Salaam, to develop and manage one of the 
nine REDD+ pilot projects implemented across the country, titled ‘Making REDD and the 
Carbon Market work for communities and Forest Conservation in Tanzania’. As a result, 
financial support  estimated at NOK 41million equivalent to approximately USD $ 6 million 
was earmarked for the implementation of the REDD+ pilot project activities(Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009).  
Following this, TFCG signed a memorandum of understanding with the Tanzania community 
forest network (MJUMITA)― a national network of 318 villages involved in participatory 
forest management (PFM believed to be operating in 11 regions and 22 districts across 
Tanzania to jointly undertake the strategic interventions for the REDD+ including 
establishing a REDD+ payments system also referred to as Community
6
 Carbon Enterprise 
hosted within MJUMITA structures as discussed below(TFCG 2009).  
TFCG/MJUMITA REDD+ pilot project encompass two REDD+ pilot sites, namely (1) the 
Kilosa REDD+ pilot site located in Eastern Arc Mountains, Morogoro region and (2) the 
Lindi REDD+ pilot site situated in Lindi rural district with coastal forests (ibid).  
Goal of the project 
 
“To reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in Tanzania 
in ways that provide direct and equitable incentives to rural communities to conserve and 
manage forests sustainably”. 
 
Project purpose 
“To demonstrate, at local, national and international levels, a pro-poor approach to 
reducing deforestation and forest degradation by generating equitable financial incentives 
from the global carbon market for those communities that are sustainably managing or 
                                                     
6
 Literally MJUMITA 
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conserving Tanzanian forests at a sub-national level” (Tanzania Forest Conservation Group 
2009). In terms of the emission reductions potential, it is estimated that the project will avoid 
110,000 tons of carbon dioxide by 2014. 
 
To attain the overall goal and purpose of the project, the following four main outputs are 
expected: 
 Output 1: To establish a self- financed Community Carbon Enterprise 
 Output 2: To develop leakage strategy to address drivers of deforestation and forest 
degradation 
 Output 3: To develop effective monitoring, evaluation and communication plan 
 Output 4: To develop robust advocacy strategy at national and international levels. 
 
Output 1: Establishing a Community Carbon Enterprise 
 
“Replicable, equitable and cost-effective models developed and tested at the group or 
community level for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) 
on village and government forest land in ways that maximize benefits to communities, forests 
and the nation”. 
 
This component is led by MJUMITA with support from different partners, namely: 
Katoomba and Forest Trends who provided support on site selection; Sokoine University of 
Agriculture and CARE―provides support on issues of carbon monitoring and carbon 
enterprise set up and engagement with carbon market, in particular on issues of 
CCB
7
monitoring procedures. 
 
Indicators for Output 1: 
- A self-financing carbon co-operative based on sound “state of the art” business 
principles established and functioning within existing MJUMITA structures by end of 
the current timeframe of the project. 
- REDD+ carbon credits revenues being distributed to at least 20 communities 
managing at least 50,000 hectares of forest by end of current timeframe of the project. 
- At least 25,000 poor men, women and children report financial benefits from REDD+. 
                                                     
7A global partnership of leading companies and non-governmental organizations created in 
2003 including CARE and Conservation International. 
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Output 2: Effectively mitigating leakage 
 
“Replicable, equitable and cost-effective models developed that are designed to reduce 
leakage across project sites and provide additional livelihood benefits to participating rural 
communities”. This component is led by TFCG with support from RECOFTC― Regional 
Community Forestry Training Centre. 
 
Indicators for Output 2 
- Leakage strategies developed and implemented in and around 20 communities 
involved in the sale of voluntary emission reduction credits 
- Leakage strategies identify drivers of deforestation and include measures to address 
those drivers. 
- 150 government, project and partner staff and 200 community leaders trained in 
REDD+ leakage strategies and climate change; 
- Increased technical backstopping and training opportunities on REDD+ and 
participatory forest management are provided over the long term to Tanzania. 
 
Output 3: Effective monitoring, evaluation and communication plan developed 
 
 
“Monitoring, evaluation and documentation processes supported that assess the overall 
impact of the project at local and national levels and communication of the findings 
undertaken”. 
This component is led by TFCG with support from the Tanzania Natural Resource Forum -
TNRF; Valuing the Arc; CARE; IRA; and Katoomba Group respectively. 
 
Output 4: Develop robust advocacy strategy at national and international levels 
 
“Advocacy process supported at the national and international levels that promote equitable 
and effective REDD benefit sharing mechanisms and in particular with regard to forest 
managers at the community level”. This component is led by MJUMITA with support from 
the Katoomba Group; CARE; TNRF and IRA. 
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Indicators for Output 4 
 
- Carbon benefit sharing agreements reached with FBD, Ministry of Finance and local 
governments in jointly managed forests. 
- The findings of the project are directly contributing to international policy dialogue in 
at least three international climate change meetings relating to REDD+. 
- The findings of the project have directly influenced Tanzanian policy in relation to 
REDD+ (Tanzania Forest Conservation Group 2009). 
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3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Introduction of REDD+ project in Kilosa district, implied a change in the governance 
structures of forests. This concerns both changes in actor structures and institutions. Hence, to 
fulfill my study objectives this chapter presents theoretical framework that has been used to 
assess the processes behind the changes in actor structures and institutions for the Kilosa 
REDD+ project. The study draws from governance structure framework by Vatn (2011) 
Figure 1 below with its underlying theory. In the following I will define governance (Section 
3.1). Next, the framework elements will be defined and discussed (Section 3.2). Third, I 
provide a working definition of transaction costs for this study (Section 3.3).  
 
       3.1. Governance 
      Governance is a wide concept that necessarily includes many aspects of a society and can be 
defined in various ways, and proposals abound. The general consensus though is that, 
governance is broader than government. It include not only actions of the state but encompass 
also actors such as NGOs; businesses and communities(Lemos & Agrawal 2006). 
      Regarding environmental governance,Paavola (2007) views environmental governance as the 
processes of “ the establishment, re-affirmation or change of institutions to resolve conflict 
over environmental resources” (p.96). Specifically, governance relates to the processes of 
developing social goals, as well as establishing and running systems to attain the set goals 
(Vatn & Vedeld 2011). 
     3.2. Governance structure 
     While conceptualizing governance as structure as discussed below, Vatn (2011) put into 
perspectives the following core elements: 1) actors; and 2) institutions. In what follows, I will 
first distinguish actors before I turn to institutions. 
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                Figure1: The elements of a governance structure 
                Source : Adapted from Vatn (2011) 
 
       3.2.1. Actors 
       Vatn (2011) distinguish two types of actors, i.e., political and economic actors. Concerning 
the former, they are defined as those actors across levels of society with power to influence 
rules governing access to economic resource or benefit streams, and interactions between 
actors having such access. 
      In the context of the Kilosa REDD+ project, political actors include district officials; village 
councils; NGOs implementing the project (i.e., TFCG and MJUMTA); and community-based 
organizations, in this case village representatives (committees).  
      Political actors at national level, include the Parliament; government officials; NGOs etc. 
While at the international level, political actors include the international donor agencies and 
international NGOs. It is worth noting that, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) whether 
national or international operate across levels, basically acting as intermediaries representing 
different interest groups.  
     While the economic actors are those actors with access to economic resource or benefit 
streams. These may include the state; communities; community groups; and individual 
respectively. Again, using the Kilosa REDD+ project as an example, economic actor is 
MJUMITA community carbon cooperative on behalf of its members. It is important to 
observe that the above political actors may also be seen as economic actors, e.g., the village 
Resource regimes: 
Institutions governing 
access to resources and 
interactions 
betweeneconomicactors. 
R    Economic actors; 
preferences and actions  
      Institutions governing the policy: 
Constitutions and collective choice rules 
R         Political actors; preferences 
actions and interactions actors; 
preferences, actions and 
interactions 
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government and the district. In the context of Tanzania, there is no clear cut between these 
actors, when it comes to the issue of forests on general land within village land boundaries.  
      3.2.2. Institutions 
       Institutions are prominent features across disciplines of social sciences and the definition of 
institutions itself has been the subject of contention. Even within one discipline such as 
economics there are divergent perspectives. For instance, there are those who define 
institutions based on individualist perspectives (North 1990; North 1997). Individualists 
claim that individuals are self-contained with predefined capabilities, as opposed to those 
who view institutions from social constructivist lenses (Vatn 2011). The latter tradition 
basically views individuals as influenced by external society in relation to their abilities, 
ideals and needs. 
      Institutions are herein understood as, conventions; norms and formally sanctioned rules (Vatn 
2005; Vatn 2011).While looking at the roles of institutions on human behavior, Vatn (2011) 
distinguish between political institutions and economic institutions. In the following, I 
explain political institutions (Subsection 3.2.2.1). Next, economic institutions will be defined 
and discussed (Subsection 3.2.2.2). 
     3.2.2.1. Political Institutions 
     Political institutions are explained as rules regulating the policy process (Vatn 2011). 
According to Vatn, institutions must not only be seen as external constraints, but also as 
important features owing to the fact that they regularize life, support values, and produce and 
protect interests. Vatn adds that, while individuals create institutions, institutions also form 
us, and facilitate the way we interact with others— thereby influencing the costs of 
interactions― that is, transaction costs (Vatn 2011). Important issue concerns the source of 
these rules and how acceptable they are, i.e., rules derived from the constitutions and 
collective choice rules such as conventions.       
     3.2.2.2. Economic Institutions 
      Economic institutions are defined as institutions governing access to resources and 
interactions between economic actors (Vatn 2011). Basically, the former concerns property 
rights, while the latter concerns the rules facilitating the interactions between actors having 
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access to economic resources or benefit attached. In what follows I will define and discuss 
the basic concepts of both property rights and interaction rules. 
      Property rights 
      Property rights defines who has access to economic resource or other benefits attached(Vatn 
2005).Bromley and Cernea (1989) defines property rights as “a structure of rights and duties 
characterizing the relationship of individuals to one another with respect to that particular 
resources” (cited in Dyngeland & Eriksson 2011, p.24). More specifically, rights are social 
relations specifying relationship between rights holders and rights regarder under a specific 
authority structure, basically the state. As formal rules, they provide the legitimacy and 
security to the rights holders of a specific resource or benefit streams (Vatn 2005).  As such, a 
natural classification of these property rights structures or regimes is to distinguish them as 
follows:(1) private property; (2) common property; (3) public property; and (4) open 
access(Vatn 2005). 
      Private property is usually thought of as a property held by an individual; but, also this 
applies to common property, which is privately owned by a group of co-owners. A practical 
example is a village land forest reserve in Tanzania, which is a property to all community 
members belonging to a given village or a specific group granted user rights among village 
members. 
      Public or state property is under the state ownership. As Vatn (2005) puts it, “ownership at 
lower level, like the county or the formalized municipality level, is largely on the same form 
and could, by changing the label from state to public property, be explicitly covered by this 
category” (p.256). Again in Tanzania an example is the district forest reserves and general 
village land forests under their jurisdiction. 
      Common property, as noted above is similar to private property, in the sense that co-owners 
are a management group that has the rights to exclude no-members. They define rights to 
resources, determine which benefit streams can be utilized, which members are eligible to 
utilize, and to what extent and means (Vatn 2005). 
      Open access is a situation with no property.  
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     Interaction rules 
      Interaction rules are coordination structures facilitating the interactions between economic 
actors, while carrying out different transactions.Vatn  (2011) divide interaction rules into four 
types, in which each type operate independently as discussed below: 
     First, there is exchange between parties; basically this form of interaction takes place in 
markets where goods and services are traded. This form of interaction takes place between 
equal parties.  
     Second, there is command, as Vat emphasizes this form of interaction ‘is based on 
hierarchical power and the authority typically rests with the state’ (p.9).The state has both 
internal and external power. The former basically concerns the power of legislation, through 
this power the state guarantees security on legally defined property rights. Moreover, through 
this power, the state regulates unwanted situations such as pollutions or externalities in the 
language of economics by setting standards. The state further has power to collect and 
establish resource redistribution mechanisms. With regard to the external power, the state 
commands its administrative systems to enforce the rules and regulations. 
     Third, community-based interaction rules represent the form of interactions which are 
characterized by cooperation and reciprocity. And, like in markets it operates horizontally, 
but, with difference in the way the interactions are conducted, i.e., exchange as opposed to 
reciprocity. 
       The last option, there no rules. In this situation actors are free to do whatever they wish, 
irrespective of possible consequences for others. It is mostly under this situation that 
externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions appear due to implicit rights of emitters. 
Taken together i.e., access rules and the interaction rules form a specific resource regime 
(Vatn 2011). 
          3.3. Transaction Costs 
       As noted earlier, the main focus of this study was to generate knowledge about the level and 
structure of transaction costs of establishing governance structure for the Kilosa REDD+ 
pilot. This section seeks to provide a working definition of transaction costs analyses in the 
REDD+ pilot areas (Section 3.3.1).  
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       Defining transaction costs 
       Arrow (1969:48) defines transaction costs as the “costs of running the economic system”. 
Dahlman (1979) divide transaction costs into three broad categories, i.e. as the costs of 
information gathering; contracting; and controlling contracts.  
      While the above definitions are exclusively to the market transactions, according toCommons 
(1934) the other types of transactions beyond markets such as:(1) Bargaining transactions 
(typically in markets); (2) Managerial transactions (within firms); and (3) Rationing 
transactions (governments, courts that distribute rights) (Vatn 2005). 
      Following Common’s latter element of rationing transactions, Vatn (2005) defines 
transaction costs as the costs of interactions between actors when establishing and running a 
given policy and legal regulations. Concerning REDD+, Vatn maintains that the costs of 
establishing and running governance structures for REDD+ are referred to as transactions 
costs (TCs) (Vatn et al. 2009; Vatn & Vedeld 2011).  
     For this study, transaction costs (TCs) are of establishing governance structure for the Kilosa 
REDD+ projects are there sources incurred by actors involved while undertaking the 
following functions: 
(1) Negotiating contracts for the pilot to get funded 
(2) General planning and administration, i.e., planning and decision-making processes 
through the setting-up of the REDD+ pilot project 
(3) Organizing and running of start-up information and communication programs such as the 
FPIC 
(4) The setting-up of the institutional basis for making REDD+ work at local level: 
- Defining necessary land rights, land use plans etc. 
- Establishing new organizations/ committees at village level.  
- Establishing the program for payments.   
                 -    The setting-up of a monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) program, and 
(5) general administration and accountancy (Vatn Unpublished).  
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     4. METHODS 
      This chapter aims to present the study methods and materials employed. This study is related 
to the IIED/UMB REDD project, which has a component focused at measuring the costs of 
establishing and running REDD+ governance structures within REDD+ pilot projects in 
different countries including Tanzania. As such, a transaction costs template was developed 
to guide the process of data collection and their analyses(Vatn Unpublished). Moreover, the 
project provided a copy of the REDD+ project contract, i.e., a contract between the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (TFCG) 
providing the basic information and obligations of the actors involved. In the following, I 
provide an account of data collection processes. First I describe the research design used 
(Section 4.1.). Next, I explain and discuss the procedures used in selection of key informants 
and data collection (Section 4.2.). Third, I explain the methods used for the data analysis 
(Section4.3). Lastly, I provide study limitations (Section 4.4.). 
4.1 Research design 
This section draws on the previous chapter as it provides an account of the analytical choices 
I made when approaching my elements of analysis. As mentioned, a template was designed to 
guide the study, i.e., specifying the study area and delimitations. As such, a case study design 
was used—the Kilosa REDD+ pilot project, in Morogoro region being my case study.  
As Bryman (2008) puts it” the basic case study entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a 
single case” (p.52). More precisely,Kothari (2009) describe a case study as a strategy for 
doing research, which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence i.e., data 
triangulation. In data triangulation, he adds, data collection methods such as use of 
interviews, literature review and observations are recommended (ibid). 
This study aimed at assessing the processes behind the establishment of the Kilosa REDD+ 
pilot project with focus on the process of introducing REDD+ in the district; identifying 
actors involved; and changes in actor structures and institutions, as well as the costs 
associated with such processes— here called transaction costs (TCs). Thus, as my research 
questions in order to address them I designed ways of obtaining and selecting the sources of 
reliable data based on local context as discussed below. 
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4.2. Selection procedures 
The study objectives and the research questions demanded that identify actors with direct 
involvement and responsibilities in the processes of establishing the Kilosa REDD+ project, 
thus possessing information or knowledge about the resources involved. As such, the 
selection process of material and key informants to answer my research questions was based 
on purposive procedures. 
 
Purposive or deliberate procedure is one of the non-probability methods, in which a 
researcher decides on those elements which he/she believes will be able to provide the 
required data (Bryman 2008). While the method is sometimes associated with greater chance 
of bias, it is useful and recommended particularly when the variables under investigation 
dictates what ought to be done in selection of both the sample and tools of data collection 
(Kothari 2009). 
 
4 out of 14 villages were selected owing to the fact that they were the only villages that had 
established REDD+ structures through the REDD+ interventions of participatory forest 
management and land use planning. Key local informants included REDD+ focal person in 
the Kilosa district; village council representatives; and members of newly formed 
committees. At the project level key informants included a consultant in-charge of the project 
supervision at the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam, and the project developers― TFCG 
and MJUMITA personnel. 
 
4.3. Data collection procedures 
Primary data from the above villages primarily for my first objective were collected using 
PRA techniques mainly semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. Concerning 
my second objective as mentioned in the previous chapter, a transaction costs template was 
developed to guide the process of data collection on cost categories associated with the 
processes of establishing the pilot(Vatn Unpublished).Many studies of transaction costs 
observe that there are challenges in measuring transaction costs empirically, partly because 
there is little professional consensus on either the definition or standard  measurement of 
transaction costs (Antinori & Sathaye 2007; McCann et al. 2005; Nathalie & Joshua 2009; 
Wertz-Kanounnikoff 2008). As a result of that, Vatn (Unpublished) not only provides 
definition of transaction costs, it serves also as an effort to address methodological challenges 
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of measuring REDD+ related transaction costs— i.e., as defined both the costs of establishing 
and running governance structures for REDD+ pilot projects.Vatn (Unpublished)suggests the 
following approaches of measuring TCs: 
 
1) Using accounts and interviews, particularly if the accounts are reliable. Vatn adds that  
interviews are important especially in cases where REDD+ developers are involved in 
more than one REDD+ pilot and costs associated with each pilot are not separated in 
accounts— yet one aims to study on of them, hence splitting of costs is required; 
 
2) Interview people and make them assess the amount of time and resources they have used 
on specific activities of REDD+ pilot project, i.e., particularly with people marginally 
involved in the REDD+ activities. 
 
3) Direct observation, ask people to record how much time they use on specific activities of 
REDD+ project and multiply with the total value of period used.  
 
As I mentioned earlier, TFCG/MJUMITA REDD+ pilot project is comprised of two REDD+ 
pilot project. As such, because of the reasons discussed below, methods 1 and 2 were used. 
The former combined were used for objective (2), and the latter was instrumental for 
objective (1), i.e., at the local level as I mentioned with focus on the process of introducing 
REDD+ in Kilosa; identifying actors involved; and changes in actor structures and 
institutions. In the following I discuss the instruments that were used to collect data along the 
mentioned variables. 
 
4.3.1. Interviews 
 
Interview as a method of data collection is common and important for both qualitative and 
quantitative research. It is argued that when a researcher uses interview research as one of the 
methods for both qualitative and quantitative research, the selected respondent must have 
access to the information asked, understand the question asked and a motivation as to why 
he/she should answer the questions accurately (Bryman 2008). Interview can be structured or 
unstructured. While the former is highly standardized and the interviewer has to follow a 
predetermined or rigid procedure, the latter commonly known as in-depth interview does not 
follow standardized format of questioning, thus the interviewer has more freedom on how the 
questions are asked, and also the interviewee can speak more freely (ibid). 
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For this study, semi-structured interviews were employed throughout. The journey of data 
collection started with a preliminary survey process of selecting reliable sources of data, and 
understanding how the implementation process of Kilosa REDD+ pilot project is organized. 
Following (section 6.1) of the contract between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the TFCG―which states that, “the annual financial statements of the Project shall be 
audited by an independent and recognized professional accountant (auditor) acceptable to 
MFA”(Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009)―I carried out one in-depth interview 
with the Norwegian Embassy staff responsible for the supervision of the TFCG/MJUMITA 
REDD+ project. As a result, I obtained the copies of audited accounts for Year 1 and 2 (i.e., 
2009/09 to 2011/08, and other written information relevant to the study, including defined 
objectives for the TFCG/MJUMITA REDD+ project. 
 
However, because this project encompass two REDD+ pilot project sites as mentioned 
earlier, and the account reports are prepared as consolidated accounts, i.e., for the whole 
project including the Lindi REDD+ pilot site, I carried out several interviews with the TFCG 
and MJUMITA staff in Dar es Salaam, involving the CEO for TFCG, Executive Secretary for 
MJUMITA; the project Manager and accountant. These interviews sought to establish the 
details of these accounts as well as to discuss with the project staff about my study objectives 
and delimitations. Following these interviews, I was able to establish the core actors involved 
in the processes of establishing the Kilosa REDD+ pilot project, and their main functions. 
 
For the accounts, I obtained more detailed data, i.e., soft copies of raw cost data specifying 
the break-down of costs categories associated with each function and actors involved in the 
processes of establishing each REDD+ pilot site. Thus, these accounts formed the basis of 
establishing a fraction of costs attributable to the Kilosa REDD+ pilot project, particularly 
along shared costs
8―through splitting exercise. To complement the accounts the following 
reports were also reviewed: the FPIC report; biannual reports and extensive document 
searches from the project website. 
 
In relation to objective (1) ― the data collection process at local levels employed PRA 
techniques, using mainly semi-structured interviews with key informant, and focus group 
discussions (FGDs). Concerning the former I interviewed the district forest officer, who is 
also REDD+ contact person in the district― the interview sought to understand the role of 
                                                     
8
 The costs associated with: 1) General planning and administration; and 2) general administration 
and accountancy. 
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the district in the implementation of the REDD+ pilot project activities. With regard to the 
latter, I interviewed both the village chairpersons and village executive officers separately, in 
order to establish the roles of their respective village governments in the implementation of 
the REDD+ project activities. 
 
4.3.2. Focus group discussions 
 
A focus group discussion (FGDs) is an approach or method of interviewing a group of 
interviewees at the same time. This method was used in all villages studied, as such it was 
used to triangulate and verify underlying myths of individual response
9
. Bryman (2008) 
describes focus group discussion as a useful method of obtaining data through which a 
researcher follow the interaction between informants, while observing how they respond to 
each other ideas. In villages studied I brought together two committees, which had been 
formed to represent their respective communities in REDD+ activities to discuss the 
implementation processes of the REDD+ project in their respective villages, their 
responsibilities; decisions and resources involved. Lastly, I conducted a group interview with 
the project field personnel, including the TFCG
10
 (2) and MJUMITA
11
 (1) ― basically asking 
them if and how the individuals involved in project activities were paid by the project. Taken 
together, I was able to double-check the data collected at this level. 
 
4.4. Data analysis 
 
As discussed above, a template for the REDD+ pilots transaction costs analyses was 
developed to guide the process of data collection, and their analyses. The template provides a 
list of functions, as well as cost categories along which data were collected. As such, an excel 
spreadsheet was developed and the data were entered and analyzed respectively see Chapter 
5. 
 
4.5. Limitations 
 
The study limitations include both technical and cultural aspects. Concerning the first aspect, 
the transaction costs template which guided the study had to be adjusted to the local 
conditions. For example the process of specifying the costs categories attributable to the 
                                                     
9
 From key informants of the village councils 
10
 TFCG field coordinator and agricultural officer, in principle in charge of leakage activities 
11
 MJUMITA field coordinator basically in charge of PFM activities 
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Kilosa REDD+ pilot project along the study cost categories was not straightforward. As such, 
assumptions had to be made, and this has been acknowledged and explained in Chapter 5. In 
addition some costs could not be obtained, for instance the costs associated with contracting 
process incurred by the project developer. Moreover, for decision-making costs at local level 
I did not include the costs of the district because this process was yet to be undertaken. 
 
Concerning the latter aspect, particularly at local level the study involved to collect data on 
historical transactions, i.e., recalling the time spent on specific activities and asking payments 
received from the REDD+ project which proved to be sensitive issues, thus affecting the 
exact estimate of costs faced by actors involved.  
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4. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter I will present and discuss findings of the study. The main aim has been to 
assess the implementation processes of the Kilosa REDD+ pilot project, and accordingly: 1) 
characterize governance structure that had been established for the Kilosa REDD+ pilot 
project; and 2) generate knowledge about the level and structure of TCs of setting up the 
above governance structure. The analysis is based on governance structure framework 
explained in Chapter 3.The analysis is divided as follows: First, I provide an overview and 
specificities of the Kilosa REDD+ pilot project (section 5.1). Next, the processes behind the 
establishment of governance structure for REDD+ project will follow (Section 5.2). Finally, I 
present TCs analysis of establishing this governance structure (Section 5.3). 
 
5.1.An overview of the Kilosa REDD+ pilot project 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, the Kilosa REDD+ pilot is part of the REDD+ project known as, 
‘Making REDD work for communities and forest conservation in Tanzania’ located in Kilosa 
district, Morogoro region. The project is implemented by the Tanzania Forest Conservation 
Group (TFCG) in partnership with Tanzania Community Forest Network (MJUMITA) ― 
both local non-governmental organizations. The latter aims to organize communities 
participating in the project, build their capacities in view of preparing them to be part of 
existing MJUMITA network
12
. By the time of this study 14 out 163 villages of the Kilosa 
district had been included in the REDD+ pilot project. These villages include Ibingu; Lunenzi 
Chabima; Munisagara; Dodoma Isanga; Mfuluni; Masugu Juu; Masugu Kati; Mkadage; 
Lumbigi; Nyali; Idete; Ilonga; and Kisongwe (see Figure3)below.  
 
The forest area of the project, according to the initial estimates is about 75,000 hectares. 
However, only 64,000 hectares are considered as potential REDD+ forests (MJUMITA 
Community Carbon Enterprise 2010). 
 
The main drivers of deforestation and forest degradation in the project area, and in the  
district in general include shifting cultivation, fire, charcoal making, timber harvesting, 
firewood collection, and livestock, i.e., burning forest for pasture among others (Forrester & 
Baraka 2010). For all these factors, however, shifting agriculture is the prevalent direct driver 
                                                     
12
 In other words, becoming members of the MJUMITA Carbon Enterprise 
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of deforestation due to its economic returns(MJUMITA Community Carbon Enterprise 
2010). The financial potential estimates for Kilosa REDD+ project Table 3 below indicates 
that, household opportunity cost of shifting cultivation for most communities in the Kilosa 
district is higher (almost triple) than the projected household REDD+ payments, based on 
what has been considered as a conservative price of USD $ 5 per ton of carbon dioxide as 
expected.  
 
Net present value (10% discount rate) of potential REDD+ household payments and shifting 
agriculture ($)  
        
  
NPV of household 
payments 
NPV of shifting 
agriculture  Difference Leverage required 
 
 
1,700,000   5,700,000   
 
-4,000,000   2.35   
    Source: Adapted from MJUMITA Community Carbon Enterprise (2010) 
 
In terms of carbon contents, the project  projections suggest that about 12,487 hectares of 
forest will be protected over a period of 30 years by the project, with an average of 69tC/ha, 
corresponding to about 253tCO2 (MJUMITA Community Carbon Enterprise 2010).However, 
strictly speaking there are some important caveats with these estimates as MJUMITA put it: 
 
“The first step in determining the financial feasibility of the Kilosa and Lindi project 
sites was to calculate the historical rates of deforestation for each area that could be 
used as an estimate of future deforestation rates. Under VCS REDD methodologies; this 
involves creating at least 3 forest/non-forest maps covering the previous 10 years. 
Additionally, for VCS the analysis should cover a reference region that is roughly 4 to 5 
times the size of the project site. Unfortunately, this level of analysis was not possible 
during the current time frame, but will be completed within the next 2 months. Instead, 
for the purpose of this business outlook, deforestation rates were calculated for just the 
project sites (defined using digitized village survey maps from the Ministry of Lands) 
comparing satellite images from 2000 to one later image. This approach is conservative 
because it likely underestimates the deforestation rates of the reference regions and does 
not allow for the possibility of accelerating rates of deforestation caused by population 
growth or migration which could only be detected by examining forest cover on multiple 
dates during the last decade”(MJUMITA Community Carbon Enterprise 2010) 
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Figure 2 Map of the Kilosa REDD+ pilot site 
Source: Forrester and Baraka (2010) 
 
5.1.1. Documenting data collection process 
 
As discussed in the previous Chapter, 4 out of 14villages were selected for primary data 
collection, i.e., for objective (1). In each individual village studied, semi-structured 
interviews with key informants, and focus group discussions (FGDs) were used. Interviewees 
were selected based on their responsibilities and direct involvement in the REDD+ project 
activities. The interviewees included one district representative; village council 
representatives; members of the organizations formed; and the project field personnel. 
 
For the objective (2), total TCs by function and actors, as well as total TCs by cost categories 
and actors, were collected using audited accounts of the project and interviews of the project 
staff. As discussed in Chapter 4, collection of data for this study started with the process of 
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selecting reliable sources of data, as such I held one interview with Mr. Simon Milledge
13
 at 
the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam, which among others sought to obtain 
certified accounts of the REDD+ project.  
 
Following the interview I obtained the copies of audited accounts for Year 1 and 2 (i.e., as of 
2009/09 to 2011/08), and other written information relevant to the study including defined 
objectives for the TFCG/MJUMITA REDD+ project. On the basis of these reports I further 
carried out interviews with the TFCG and MJUMITA staff, including the CEO for TFCG, 
Executive Secretary for MJUMITA; the project Manager and accountant in order to have 
more clarifications on these accounts as discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
In total, 65 key informants’ interviews were conducted with the actors at the project, district 
and village levels. Moreover, the following documents and reports were reviewed to 
supplement the above sources: the project design document; biannual progress reports; 
baseline study reports; FPIC report; and extensive document searches from the project 
website (Forrester et al. 2011; MJUMITA Community Carbon Enterprise 2010; Tanzania 
Forest Conservation Group 2009; TFCG 2010; TFCG & MJUMITA 2010a; TFCG & 
MJUMITA 2010b; TFCG & MJUMITA 2011a; TFCG & MJUMITA 2011b). 
 
5.2. The governance structure for the Kilosa REDD+ pilot project. 
 
This section will present the processes behind the establishment of the Kilosa REDD+ pilot 
project. First, the actors involved in the implementation processes of the project are presented 
(Section 5.2.1). Next, I explain the institutional context for the implementation of the project 
interventions (Section 5.2.2). Third, the process of introducing REDD+ project through the 
FPIC process are presented (Subsection 5.2.3.). Fourth, the organizations and institutions 
established are presented (Subsection 5.2.4.). 
5.2.1. Actors involved in establishing the Kilosa REDD+ pilot project 
While characterizing the governance structure for the Kilosa REDD+ project that had been 
established, the focus was on political actors, i.e., their preferences and actions (Vatn 2011). 
As mentioned earlier, through the REDD+ pilot project TFCG and MJUMITA aims to make 
                                                     
13
 Environment/climate change consultant for the Norwegian Embassy in-charge of the REDD+ 
pilot projects. 
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REDD+ work for communities and forest conservation, by providing financial incentives to 
the village level forest managers through established REDD+ payments system also referred 
to as the ‘Tanzania Community Carbon Enterprise14, which will function within the existing 
MJUMITA structures based on demonstrated emission reductions from deforestation and 
forest degradation within and outside their respective village land forest reserves (MJUMITA 
Community Carbon Enterprise 2010). 
 
The above model is based on participatory forest management, with a focus to community-
based forest management, as REDD+ regime. According to the project documents, 
MJUMITA Carbon Enterprise will act on behalf of the REDD+ communities as service 
provider, i.e., the MJUMITA enterprise will aggregate REDD+ credits generated by these 
communities, market and sell them. Accordingly, the enterprise will receive and manage, and 
distribute the accrued revenues through established village level REDD+ by laws—
containing the rules which will govern the distribution of REDD+ benefits (Tanzania Forest 
Conservation Group 2009).In the following actors involved in establishing the above 
governance structure for the Kilosa REDD+ project are presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
14
 ‘Cost-effective model’ 
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Box 1. Tanzania Forest and Conservation Group (TFCG) 
 
Tanzania Forest Conservation Group has over 20 years’ experience in working with issues 
relating to forest conservation in Tanzania. Through TFCG’s five programmes: advocacy, 
participatory forest management, environmental education, community development and 
research, TFCG has succeeded in rolling out innovative and high-impact solutions to the 
challenges facing Tanzania’s forests and the people that depend on them. In particular, TFCG 
has been active in advocating for improved forest management and reduced deforestation 
throughout this period. TFCG has been at the forefront of the national awareness campaigns 
on forest conservation including the implementation of the information, education and 
communication component of the recent UNDP/GEP Conservation and Management of the 
Eastern Arc Management project and the development of the national communication 
strategy for the national forest programme and the participatory forest management 
programme. TFCG has also been active in promoting practical solutions to reduce 
deforestation and carbon emissions including the participatory forest management, improved 
land use, improved agriculture, fuel efficient stoves, and tree planting. TFCG has also been 
actively involved in developing an advocacy strategy with other Southern Civil Society 
Organizations in UNFCC meetings to make carbon financing for REDD to be more pro-poor. 
In addition to advocating for improvements in REDD at the international level, TFCG is 
eager to pilot such an approach within Tanzania. To achieve this, TFCG will work closely 
with the Tanzanian Community Forest Conservation Network MJUMITA 
Source : (Tanzania Forest Conservation Group 2009). 
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Figure3 below shows the administrative structure of the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group. 
It is important to note that the Kilosa REDD+ field office is only for field level activities. The 
office is shared by both organizations, i.e., two personnel from TFCG and three personnel 
including a driver from MJUMIA. 
 
Figure 3 Organizational structure of TFCG 
Source: Adapted from Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (2009) 
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Box 2: Tanzania Community Forest Conservation Network (MJUMITA) 
MJUMITA is a national network of community groups involved in participatory forest 
management. The network provides a forum for capacity building, advocacy, and 
communication for these groups. It was established originally in response to the need for a 
forum for communities to share experiences with regard to participatory forest management 
and engage in dialogue with the Forestry and Beekeeping Division on ways to address policy, 
legal and implementation issues in relation to PFM.MJUMITA currently has72 affiliated 
local area networks which are made up of Village Natural Resource Committees (VNRCs), 
and Environmental user groups.  The local level networks are registered legal entities or are 
in the process of being registered. MJUMITA members are present in 22 districts, 318 
villages and representing around 500 user groups or VNRCs involved in participatory forest 
management countrywide. MJUMITA has maintained good working relations to government, 
particularly FBD, other CSOs working within the Natural Resource Management sector as 
well as relevant university departments. MJUMITA was initially supported by TFCG starting 
from 2000 and became an independent NGO in 2007.MJUMITA is currently engaged with an 
internal change management process that aims at strengthening the organization as a whole 
with a view to improving the delivery of support to community networks and engaging 
constructively in policy dialogue. Many lessons have been learned by MJUMITA with regard 
to community networking on participatory forest management and from the community forest 
network in Nepal, FECOFUN, who have been actively engaged in representing community 
forestry interests at national and policy levels. 
A key issue that continues to be raised by MJUMITA members is the need to increase 
benefits, particularly cash incomes, from participatory forest management. Many members 
claim that the revenues from participatory forest management are not sufficient to cover the 
costs of forest management and that incentives must be increased if forests on village land are 
to be protected in the long term. The stage of competence MJUMITA has reached as a 
National Community Forestry Network makes it a relevant partner in the endeavor of making 
REDD and the carbon market work for communities and sustainable forest management in 
Tanzania” (ibid). 
Source: Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (2009) 
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The figure below depicts MJUMITA in the context of the Tanzania community carbon 
enterprise. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Organizational structures for MJUMITA 
Source: Adapted from Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (2009) 
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Table 2 presents the summary of the TFCG/MJUMITA REDD+ project expected outcomes 
and other   partners involved. These partners have supported the establishment of the Kilosa 
REDD+ pilot project at different levels. To be consistent, the next discussion will focus on 
output 1― local government (joint planning and implementation of field level activities), i.e., 
the decisions and procedures guiding these processes/activities. 
Table 2: Summary of involved actors and expected outcomes 
Output Lead Agency Support 
 
Output 1:To set up Carbon 
financing for MJUMITA community 
forest 
 
MJUMITA 
SUA (with regard to developing participatory carbon 
monitoring). 
Katomba Group (marketing VERs, financing mechanism, 
carbon baselines) 
Local government (joint planning and implementation of 
field level activities) 
Care International Poverty, Environment and Climate 
Network through in puts on cooperative structure and legal 
issues 
 
Output 2: Reducing Leakage 
 
TFCG 
Local governments (assistance with tree planting, 
improved agriculture and bylaw formulation) 
RECOFTC (preparing and implementing training 
programme on community forestry, REDD and leakage 
training programme) 
Output: Documentation, Monitoring, 
Evaluation and Learning 
 
TFCG 
Katomba Group (forums at national and regional level to 
disseminate project findings and lessons 
TNRF in the production of simplified guides and updates 
Output 4: Advocacy at national and 
international levels 
 
MJUMITA 
Care International Poverty, Environment and Climate 
Network and Katomba Group (advocacy processes at the 
international level) 
Source: Adapted from Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (2009) 
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5.2.2. Institutional context for implementation of the REDD+ interventions 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Tanzania Forest Act 2002; Local Government Act1982; Land 
Act 1999; and village land Act 1999 provides the legal framework for the villages to manage 
forests resource
15
 through the implementation of participatory forest management. In relation 
to this TFCG/MJUMITA REDD+ pilot project focus on establishing community-based forest 
management, i.e., putting general land forests, i.e., de facto open access within village land 
boundaries under village land forest reserves (VLFRs).However, as I said this process of 
institutional change―requires a village or villages which intend to set up community-based 
forest management to fulfill the formalization steps spelled out under the PFM guidelines 
(see Table 1, p.12). 
 
In brief, the proposed village general land forest must be surveyed and demarcated. Next, a 
village natural resource committee must be established through election; then the forest 
management plan and corresponding by-laws must be drafted and approved by the village 
general assembly. Following the village level approval,  village council must submit them 
together with the map of the proposed village forest reserve to the District Council for the 
review and approval (United Republic of Tanzania 2002). When the district council approves 
these documents, then the village land forest reserve is registered/or formalized by the 
district. Following this legal formalization, the village council is granted executive power to 
manage and enforce established forest management plans and by-laws containing rules and 
sanctions through the village natural resource committees.  
 
      Furthermore, despite the continued lack of international REDD+ binding convention —high 
level decision-making procedures or rules have been developed to guide early actions of 
REDD+. Following Bali decision, and in accordance with the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP)—UN-REDD+ developed guidelines to inform 
the implementation of REDD+ activities on the ground. These guidelines emphasize the 
principles of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) as the preconditions to the countries 
participating in the program. In what follows I provide an overview of these FPIC elements, 
before I present how they were fulfilled in Kilosa. 
 
                                                     
15
 Note that, carbon as new forest resource is not yet defined.  
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5.2.2.1. Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) principles 
 
UN-REDD (2011) defines the FPIC principles as follows: 
Free concerns, a process that is self-directed by community from whom consent is being 
sought, unencumbered by coercion, expectations or timelines that are externally imposed 
(p.8). Prior concerns “ to a period of time in advance of an activity or process when consent 
should be sought, as well as the period between when consent is sought and when consent is 
given or withheld (ibid). While informed concerns “to the type of information that should be 
provided prior to seeking consent and also as part of the ongoing consent process” (ibid) 
 
Consent relates to, “the decision made by indigenous peoples and other local communities 
reached through their customary decision-making process. The collective right to give or 
withheld consent applies to all projects, activities; legislative; administrative measures; 
policies; and their associated processes and phases that directly impact the lands, territories, 
resources, and livelihoods of indigenous peoples and other local communities. Consent must 
be sought and granted or withheld according to the unique formal or informal political-
administrative dynamic of each community (ibid). 
 
Anderson (2011) views FPIC as, “the establishment of conditions under which people 
exercise their fundamental right to negotiate the terms of externally imposed policies, 
programs, and activities that directly affect their livelihoods or wellbeing, and to give or 
withhold their consent to them” (p.15). While looking at issues of transparency and 
participation Lyster (2011) asserts that, “it is essential for indigenous peoples and local 
communities to be able to access information about: where REDD+ sites will be established; 
who will manage the sites; how they will be impacted by the establishment of sites and the 
legal obligations which they will have within the sites; what financial benefits will be 
distributed for managing REDD+ sites; and, importantly, what financial benefits they are 
likely to receive” (p.2). To what extent were the communities involved in the FPIC process in 
Kilosa then? The following subsection accounts the process. 
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5.2.3. Application of FPIC in Kilosa 
 
In June 2010, in line with the FPIC requirements, REDD+ project developers― TFCG and 
MJUMITA initiated a process of informing the communities which had been selected to 
participate in the project about REDD+(Katomba group 2010),and the REDD+ pilot project 
plans. The consultation process started with the official launching of the REDD+ project to 
the Kilos district authorities. The report documenting the FPIC process,  says that the official 
launching ceremony was attended by the District Council and Village Government officials 
from the villages participating in the project(Forrester et al. 2011). 
 
According to the District Forest Officer, who is also the REDD+ contact person in the 
district―the officials of the district received well the plans of the project presented to them, 
and accordingly the district authorities assured the project Manager, Bettie Luwuge who 
represented both organizations cooperation whenever needed (A. Mazingira, pers.comm, 
2011). Following the official launching, TFCG/MJUMITA personnel in collaboration with 
the District Natural Resource Office (DNRO) conducted what is described as intensive 
consultative sub-village level meetings for a period of about 4 months across 14 villages. 
According to the report which documented the FPIC process, sub-village level meetings 
aimed at reaching all community members, including marginalized groups(Forrester et al. 
2011). 
 
The report further indicates that, villagers who attended the meetings were provided time to 
express their concerns, through a question and answer session in each sub-village meeting. It 
is emphasized that the REDD+ team informed villagers about their right to accept or reject 
the REDD+ project, and that once they accept the project, they will be required to elect their 
representatives to be involved in the REDD+ project activities. The report says also that, 
through consensus villagers consented to implement the REDD+ project. The following table 
presents the level of villager’s participation in the FPIC process relative to the total adult 
population across 14 villages. 
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      Table 3: Sub-village meetings through FPIC process (From August to November 2010) 
Village Adult population Sub-village Attendance Total attendance 
      Men Women   
Ibingu 658 4 118 49 167 
Lunenzi 270 2 63 24 87 
Chabima 520 3 88 41 129 
Munisagara 958 4 85 53 136 
Dodoma Isanga 850 3 113 101 214 
Mfuluni 442 3 88 73 161 
Masugu Juu 95 1 51 30 81 
Masugu Kati 264 1 72 51 123 
Mkadage 285 1 44 14 58 
Lumbigi 1787 3 209 74 283 
Nyali 1162 11 198 234 432 
Idete 726 5 139 72 211 
Ilonga 2962 7 213 206 419 
Kisongwe 1711 3 71 21 131 
 Total 12679 51 1552 1043 2632 
Source: Modified table adapted fromForrester et al. (2011) 
 
Table 3 above shows the total adult
16
 population from 14 villages who participated in the 
FPIC meetings. The data suggest that only about 21 percent of the total adult population 
attended consultative meetings, hence representing those consented. Of the total number of 
attendees women represented about 40 percent, whereas men accounted for 60 percent. The 
table further indicates that, the number of sub-villages per village range from 1 to 11, with an 
average of about 4.For the 4 villages studied the attendance varied significantly― exception 
of Dodoma Isanga, for the rest it appears women were poorly represented. 
 
While the data suggests the overall poor attendance, the report documenting the FPIC process 
writes that, “ although FPIC is a long term, ongoing approach, so far it appears to have been 
effective, particularly in its principle aim of providing information for as many people as 
possible about and of gaining their consent (ibid, p.31). The report further suggest that while 
the FPIC process was length exercise the project staff were able to involve all stakeholders, 
thus emphasizing that the anticipated outcomes will be sustainable. However, one wonders 
if21 % represented the views of all those that did not participate in this crucial decision- 
                                                     
16
 An adult person according to the Tanzanian law must have 18 years of age. 
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making process. For example, there are concerns with Masai community; experience from the 
focus group discussions I held revealed that the Masai communities did not participate in all 
sub-village meetings, and surprisingly the participants (community representatives) voiced 
satisfaction with them not being part of the process. In fact the FPIC report summarized this 
issue, as under: 
 
“One group who were not represented was pastoralist in Kilosa. In some villages 
(e.g. Chabima, Dodoma Isanga, Masugu Juu, Nyali, Ibingu) Masai and Barabaig 
may pass through to graze their cattle, particularly, in the dry season. In Chabima, 
there have been conflicts with Masai livestock keepers grazing cattle in the forest, 
and during land use planning, people were hostile to the idea of setting aside an 
area of grazing – ‘we don’t want this’, they objected, because then Masai will come 
to this area’. No pastoralists came to the sub village meetings, although they were 
expected in Dodoma Isanga and Nyali (ibid). 
Three out of four villages studied are mentioned above, and indeed these villages expressed 
their anger and hostility towards Masai when I asked them to describe the exercise of land 
use planning and issues involved. The common argument in all FGDs exercise was that, they 
did not allocate land for grazing due to the fact that doing so could imply granting Masai 
access to their land. I asked if they or other community members do not keep animals like 
cows, goats etc., and the responses I received were not convincing. In fact, they did not like 
to discuss the issue of Masai at all.  
Unlike FGDs, however, village council members I interviewed in Dodoma Isanga and 
Chabima revealed that village leaders seem to be worried of this issue because of ongoing 
conflict between two communities, i.e., farmers and pastoralists(Benjaminsen et al. 2009)― 
they argued that  REDD+ might exacerbated this protracted conflict, particularly in Dodoma 
Isanga where village leaders voiced concerns about the issue of land shortage. While the 
REDD+ project implementers committed extra resources in order to create awareness among 
the Masai community― as part of the broader leakage strategies, this conflict will be one of 
the challenges that could be beyond the capacity of the REDD+ project to handle, thus 
negating the efforts possibly gained. 
 
 
 47 
 
5.2.4. Organizations and institutions formed 
 
5.2.4.1. Organizations 
 
As I mentioned above, villagers were informed about what it implied once they accept to 
implement the REDD+ project. According to the village council representatives I 
interviewed, as part of the FPIC process each sub-village through election 2 members were 
elected to represent their respective sub- villages at village level. Interviewees added that, 
following sub-village elections, each village council convened a village general assembly 
meeting to approve the elected sub-village individuals as members of village level 
committees in the REDD+ activities. Following the approval of these committees, village 
assembly also officially launched the implementation of REDD+ project activities. Note that, 
village level committees include two independent committees, i.e., village natural resource 
committee (VNRC) and village land use committee (VLUC). 
 
In Chabima; Dodoma Isanga; Ibingu and Kisongwe each Village Natural Resource 
Committee is comprised of at least 12 members and 10 for village land use committee 
respectively. According to village council officials one of the criteria during election of sub-
village members was at least to have one third of committee members as women― 
irrespective of their level of illiteracy. The formation of these committees as well as the 
approval of REDD+ project by village general assemblies, created the basis of initiating the 
processes of setting up community-based institutions. 
 
5.2.4.2. Institutions 
 
Integrated PFM 
 
As noted earlier, through the implementation of participatory forest management measures, 
notably the community-based forest management village government could be granted 
executive rights to manage the village land forest reserve, through an elected natural resource 
committee(United Republic of Tanzania 2002). Community-based forest management takes 
place on general land forest, i.e. De facto open access within village land boundaries 
governed by the Land Act 1999― hence in order for the villages to set up CBFM―the 
proposed general land forest must be surveyed, demarcated and formally transferred to the 
village land following National FM guidelines. 
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In the context of REDD+ issues, TFCG/MJUMITA adopted an integrated approach of 
participatory forest management, i.e., combining PFM and land use planning exercise― that 
is, as part of village land formalization process, and also implementation of leakage plans to 
address local drivers of deforestation. Like PFM the latter exercise is done also in line with 
the National land use planning commission guidelines andLand Use Planning Act 2007.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, in each individual village studied, through the participatory 
processes involving the district land surveyor; village natural resource committee; village 
land use committee; and village council representatives― the project field staff facilitated the 
establishment of community-based forest management. According to the village council 
interviews and focus group discussions—village land allocation process was based on the 
village land size and villagers needs. Examples of different types of land use allocated in 
almost all villages studied include the land for settlement; cultivation; village land forest for 
sustainable use; and village land forest reserve. When I asked in FGDs about the land for 
grazing, they said there are no pastoralists among them (see discussion under the FPIC 
process above). 
 
Following the establishment of community-based forest management as REDD+ regime, the 
project staff further facilitated the processes of drafting and approval of the following 
management institutions: 1) village land use plans and corresponding by-laws;  2) forest 
management plans including by-laws; and 3) the REDD+ by-laws. Concerning the latter, they 
are rules which will govern the distribution of expected REDD+ benefits. By the time of this 
study, however, these documents had been submitted to the district council, but they were 
awaiting approval before they could be enforced as per the Forest Act 2002.  
 
Furthermore, as an outcome of the FPIC process and the above processes of setting up 
governance structure for the Kilosa REDD+ pilot project, each village government together 
with the community representatives signed a contract with MJUMITA field personnel who 
also signed on behalf of the MJUMITA Carbon Enterprise. According to the FPIC report the 
roles and responsibilities of the communities, include not least to: 1) effectively enforce the 
rules and plans, as the operational tools for the management and conservation of the forests 
under their jurisdictions; and 2) seek consent from MJUMITA before they can be involve in 
any other project(s) which might be in conflict with MJUMITA Carbon Enterprise interests.  
 
 49 
 
To ensure an effective and coordinated flow of information the report states that: “One 
person will be appointed as community communication facilitator. He/she will act as a 
channel for information and feedback between the project and the communities (ibid, p.19).It 
is important to note that, it was not yet clear at the time of this study to establish who will be 
exactly the REDD+ beneficiaries― that is, in the context of the community carbon 
enterprise. As the notion of rewarding village level forest managers as stipulated in the 
project documents is confusing when it comes to the concept of individual dividend or  
payment to every village member including children. 
     5.3. The level and structure of costs of establishing governance structure 
for REDD+ project in Kilosa. 
This section presents TCs analysis of establishing the aforementioned governance structure 
for the Kilosa REDD+ pilot project. The analysis is structured as follows. First, total TCs 
summed up by function and actors are presented and explained (Subsection 5.3.1). Next, 
village level costs of 4 villages studied are presented and explained (Subsection 5.3.2). Third, 
total TCs by cost categories and actors are presented (Subsection 5.3.3).Lastly, TCs per 
hectare of expected forest to be protected and per ton of carbon dioxide expected to be 
avoided are presented (Subsection 5.3.4). 
5.3.1. Costs by function and actors 
Table 4 below presents the range of total TCs by function and actors. Total costs share of 
each function, i.e., general planning and administration costs; general administration and 
accountancy costs; the FPIC process costs; and institutions and MRV system set up costs 
range from 2 to 68percent of the total TCs. In the following subsections the costs categories 
associated with each function are further explained. 
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5.3.1.1. General planning and Administration 
 
As mentioned earlier, general planning and administration are part of the shared costs with 
the divide pilots. As discussed above, the potential REDD+ forest area for the Kilosa REDD+ 
pilot is about 64 000 ha, whereas the potential REDD+ forest area for the Lindi REDD+ pilot 
project  is about 53 000 ha(MJUMITA Community Carbon Enterprise 2010).Thus, in order to 
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ascertain the costs attributable to the Kilosa REDD+ project, a simplified formula was 
developed for the splitting exercise based on the percentage55 % of the total potential 
REDD+ forests. 
 
Table 4 shows that the total costs of general planning and administration account for 68 % of 
the total TCs. While breaking-down the cost of general planning and administration by actors 
as per Table 4― personnel and office costs are significant costs constituting about 65 % of 
the total costs of general planning and administration. The other costs constituting general 
planning and administration include consultancy costs. Consultancy costs account for 16 % 
of total costs of general planning and administration. These costs include the costs associated 
with the processes of establishing baseline studies, including site selection; leakage strategy 
development, i.e., analysis of drivers of deforestation and stakeholders, agricultural strategy 
design, and capacity building through training on PFM, leakage and REDD+; advocacy 
strategy development including overall awareness campaigns through policy briefs 
development and distribution and participations in various national and international 
meetings and HIV strategy development for the area under the project. These costs include 
also the costs associated with internal monitoring, evaluation and communication processes 
of the project progress through periodical evaluation meetings and workshops which bring 
together the project staff and partners, and the management of the project website. 
 
      5.3.1.2. General administration and accountancy costs 
General administration and accountancy costs include personnel costs for support staff and 
office costs. These costs account for about 9 % of the total TCs. 
 
5.3.1.3. The FPIC process costs 
 
Following the FPIC process described earlier, Table 4 indicates that the costs of the FPIC 
process represent about 2 percent of the total TCs. The FPIC costs include the costs of the 
project personnel; the district representatives; and the village council representatives as 
compensation of their time spent in the FPIC process (i.e., allowances), as well as 
consumables borne by the REDD+ project. However, while the study was able to understand 
that the village council officials were satisfied with the compensation they received; it was 
not possible to establish whether the district officials involved, i.e., the district forest officer 
and his senior― the district natural resource officer were happy as well.  
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During my interview with him he neither responded positively nor negatively. Nevertheless, 
given the fact that the meetings had to be scheduled according to their availability― which is 
one of the factors that was mentioned to be behind the FPIC process taking longer than 
expected― it is assumed here that their time allocated to the REDD+ activities represented 
low opportunity cost; given also that the REDD+ project provided transport It is assumed 
here that their allowances were reasonable. 
 
In relation to the villagers cost, i.e., their time value or opportunity cost of participating in the 
FPIC process Table 5 below presents the estimates. 
  Table 5. Villagers opportunity cost ($) 
   
Village Population(Adult) Sub-village Total attendance Duration Costs  
        (Hrs.)   
Ibingu 658 4 167 10 313 
Lunenzi 270 2 87 5 82 
Chabima 510 3 129 9 218 
Munisagara 959 4 136 12 306 
Dodoma Isanga 850 3 214 10 401 
Mfuluni 442 3 161 6 181 
Masugu Juu 95 1 81 2 30 
Masugu Kati 264 1 123 4 92 
Mkadage 285 1 58 3 33 
Lumbigi 1788 3 283 13 690 
Nyali 1162 11 432 20 1620 
Idete 726 5 211 10 396 
Ilonga 2962 7 419 11 864 
Kisongwe 1711 3 131 9 221 
  12679 51 2632 124 5447 
      Source : Modified table adapted fromForrester et al. (2011) 
 
Table 5 above shows the summary of the adult population attendance in the FPIC meetings in 
each village and total time (hrs.) spent.  In order to ascertain the opportunity cost of villager’s 
participation in each village meetings―their time spent were converted in monetary terms 
using an average village farm wage rateof2500 TSHS about USD $ 1.5 per day for 8hrs — 
which was determined in focus group discussions. Hourly wage estimates of USD $ 0.19 
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(i.e., $ 1.5/8hrs) was multiplied by the number of attendance, and then multiplied by total 
hours per village. The estimates added up to about USD $5447.  
 
     5.3.1.4. Institutions building costs 
Institutions set up costs include the costs of establishing the land use plans and corresponding 
by-laws. These costs also include the costs of establishing village forest reserves and 
associated structures including the village forest management plans and by-laws, as well as 
the REDD+ by-laws as discussed above. The total costs of establishing community- based 
forest management in 14 villages as a percentage of the total TCs account for 16 %. These 
costs include the costs associated with awareness raising, village land boundary verification; 
conducting participatory forest resources assessment (PFRA) including identification of 
REDD+ village forest reserve and mapping;  drafting and approval by village assemblies of 
the above management institutions; and administrative costs, i.e., allowances and 
consumables.  
 
It is important to note that these costs do not include the costs associated with the decision 
making process at the district level, i.e. the review and approval of the above documents by 
the district council. In terms of the costs associated with the follow up process of village land 
titles, these will be part of the general planning and administration costs which will be 
captured in the second phase of TCs analysis. 
 
5.3.1.5. MRV system costs 
 
For the MRV system, TFCG/MJUMITA REDD+ project is required to develop two types of 
PDDs, i.e., one that is developed in accordance with the Voluntary Carbon Standards (VCS) 
and the other developed following Carbon, Community and Biodiversity standards (CCB). 
As such, the MRV costs include costs associated with the ongoing processes of establishing 
the project baselines, i.e., accounting deforestation rate with use of both remote sensing 
technologies and ground measurements consistent with voluntary carbon procedures. The 
costs include also the costs associated with capacity building through training of the project 
staff -GIS officer and the village natural resource committees on-ground level monitoring and 
reporting procedures. Concerning the costs of setting up social and biodiversity baseline, the 
associated costs include the costs of training the project staff on social impact assessment; the 
costs of village visioning exercise; and the costs of carrying out in-depth biodiversity surveys 
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within the project area. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that the costs of MRV reported herein 
are underestimated due to the fact that, by the time of this study the processes of establishing 
the project baselines were still in early stages. For instance, as noted above apart from social 
impact assessment study that had been completed through village visioning exercise, the 
processes of accounting deforestation rate had not yet started (TFCG & MJUMITA 2011b).  
 
 5.3.2. Village level costs ($) 
This subsection presents the village level costs by function between 4 villages studied. 
 
Table 6. Village Costs($) 
      
                                                Village   
 
Sum1 Sum2 
Function   Ibingu Chabima Dodoma Isanga Kisongwe     
LUP   10843   7567 7988 26398 92393 
CBFM   8319   4846 6730 19895 69633 
Village office Construction       8569 8569 119966 
    19162   12413 23287 54862 281992 
Area (ha)   2505 2123 2590 3392     
Sum1: presents total TCs of4 villages Sum 2: presents total TCs of 14 villages 
(Using scale up method) 
 
Table 6, indicates that the costs by function between villages vary less compared to their 
respective village forest area. The possible explanation for this relative low variation is 
mainly twofold. First, the processes of carrying out these tasks are focused at village level 
and the facilitators, i.e., TFCG and MJUMITA field staff use a set format across villages. 
Second, because most villages are located far away from the field office, as part of the overall 
strategy of reducing costs, particularly costs related to consumables such as fuel as well as 
maintenance, the field staff camp in the villages when carrying out these tasks. 
 
Concerning the costs of village office construction, only the costs of one village was 
available by the time of this study, and it is expected that all participating villages will benefit 
from this support because village office will be shared between the village council; village 
land registrar; and MJUMITA networks in their respective villages. Hence, the study assumes 
the above costs as maximum estimates. Perhaps the next phase of TCs analysis will have to 
test this assumption by looking at the costs of other village offices that are likely to be 
finished by now, like Chabima village office which was under construction. These costs 
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include the costs of brick-making machine and other construction related materials such as 
cement, roofing materials, windows, doors and office equipment.  
 
However, although the villages studied had established REDD+ by-laws, by the time of this 
study these by-laws were provisional. In other words MJUMITA was still making 
consultations on the payment modalities and organizational structures, i.e. how REDD+ 
money or other benefits should be distributed and who should handle the distribution. It 
appears that— MJUMITA carbon enterprise has been institutionalized through village level 
REDD+ by-laws defining the rules of REDD+ benefits distribution, as well as a special 
committee which will handle the distribution aspects has been established in each village  
(Vatn, A. pers. Comm., 2013).As such, the above village level costs do not reflect the costs 
associated with these processes. Whether these willincrease the overall costs of village level 
costs (sum
2
), it is not easy to predict. 
 
5.3.3. Costs by cost categories and actors 
 
Table 7 below presents the break-down of costs by cost categories and actor associated with 
the above functions of setting up the Kilosa REDD+ pilot project. 
           Table 7. Costs by cost categories and actors ($) 
 
Categories 
TFCG TFCG MJUMITA MJUMITA Consultancy District Village Villagers Sum 
Head 
office 
Local 
office 
Head 
office 
Local 
office           
Personnel costs 232283 113348 161517 186540 190004 79219 98553 5447 1063868 
Office costs incl. 
consumables 35753 60182 23508 37666 0 0 0 0 157109 
Travel costs 59005 0 3663 0 0 0 0 0 62668 
Capital assets 27663 0 16930 0 0 0 0 0 44593 
 
TOTAL 354704 173530 205618 224206 190004 79219 98553 5447 1331281 
 
  
        
  
Table 7 shows that total costs by cost categories falling upon actors varied significantly. 
These costs range from almost zero percent, i.e., opportunity cost of villager’s participation in 
the FPIC process to 40 percent of total TCs. 40 percent represents summed personnel, office, 
travel, and capital costs for both TFCG and MJUMITA head office, including MJUMITA 
carbon enterprise. Villagers opportunity cost is insignificant of the total TCs, because they 
are marginally involved in the REDD+ activities, as noted their participation beyond the 
FPIC process is based on representation. 
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The district costs represent costs estimate borne by the REDD+ project, as payments to the 
district surveyor based on total costs of 4 villages studied (Table 6). Whereas the village costs 
represent the estimated costs as payments to village councils and members of community 
organizations involved in the decision- making processes. 
 
Regarding capital cost, Table 7 shows summed total of depreciation and maintenance costs of 
the project capital assets for both organizations, i.e., motor vehicles and motor cycles. The 
method and assumption used to determine depreciation value for capital assets is explained 
below. The study of TCs analysis is based on the assumption that the set up period will be 
done through the first three years of the project implementation. Since the project accounts 
like any other non-governmental organization are prepared as income and expenditure, the 
accounts include running costs, thus to ascertain the costs attributable to the set up phase the 
study calculated annual depreciation value of these assets based on their total value reported 
in the accounts. As such, a fixed percentage (10%) on the diminishing value was used based 
on the official interest rate
17
 of about 8 % as per the National bank of Tanzania for the year 
2009, i.e., the year these assets were purchased
18
. With regard to the costs of office 
equipment I charged two third of their total costs (see costs detail for both capital assets and 
office equipment appendix 1). Note that I have used the official interest rate of 8% which 
basically under estimates depreciation value, hence the overall set up costs because there was 
no any other alternative. 
 
5.3.4. TCs per hectare of protected forests and per ton of carbon (CO2) 
dioxide as expected. 
 
This section provides the analysis and discussion of my final research question. As noted 
above, the village forest reserves area expected by 2014 is about 64000 hectares(MJUMITA 
Community Carbon Enterprise 2010).These projections also indicates that, 12 487 ha of 
deforestation will be avoided over the period of 30 years, generating an average of69tC/ha, 
corresponding to 253tCO2/ha (ibid). While the author
19
highlights that these are rough 
estimates, implying they could be more or less, thus far, the project is yet to establish the 
                                                     
17
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/tanzania/interest-rate 
18
 (see the asset list and their original costs in appendix 1) 
19Theron Morgan-Brown (Former MJUMITA technical advisor) 
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actual baseline against which its additionality will be measured. Thus, based on the study 
findings, TCs per hectare of protected forest are about USD $ 21/ha of total TCs. In terms of 
per ton of carbon dioxide as expected the results suggest about SD $ 0.4tCO2/ha.   
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6. Conclusion and Recommendation 
     6.1. Conclusions 
      This thesis has been to assess the process behind the establishment of the Kilosa REDD+ 
pilot project. The assessment covered the period of the first 2 years, i.e., from 09/2009 to 
08/2011. Two main objectives guiding the thesis have been 1) to characterize the form of the 
REDD+ governance structure that has been established for the Kilosa REDD+ pilot project; 
and 2) to generate knowledge about the level and structure of costs of establishing this 
governance structure. Introduction of REDD+ in Kilosa has implied changes in governance 
structures of forests, i.e., changes in both actor structures and institutions. For these reasons, I 
have employed a theoretical framework of governance structure as my tool of analyzing the 
process behind such changes and outcomes. Concerning the costs associated with these 
changes— here referred to as transaction costs (TCs) the study have used standardized 
working definition of TCs(Vatn 2011; Vatn Unpublished). 
Concerning the first objective, the research questions were to assess (1) who were the actors, 
and what were their responsibilities in the process? (2) To what extent were the local 
communities involved in the process? And (3) what type of organizations and institutional 
structures had been established?  
With regard to second objective, three related questions have further functioned to structure 
my thesis: (1) what were the TCs by function and actors involved?  (2)What were the total 
TCs by cost categories and actors? And finally (3) what are the TCs per hectare of protected 
forests, and per ton of carbon dioxide as expected? 
Key findings of the thesis are presented as under: 
      Concerning the actor involved in the processes of establishing the REDD+ pilot project. The 
thesis has shown that the core actors include the project developers― TFCG and MJUMITA; 
district personnel; the village councils; and community representatives in the form of 
committees. It has further shown their main responsibilities.  
      First, through the FPIC process the project staff introduced REDD+ project to key 
stakeholders, including the district authorities and the village government officials from the 
villages participating in the project. Following the official launching of the project, the 
project staff in collaboration with the District Natural Resource Office continued with the 
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processes of awareness raising and consultation across 51 sub-villages, constituting 14 
villages that had been selected to work with the REDD+ project. As an outcome of this 
process communities consented to implement the REDD+ project. Moreover, as part of the 
FPIC processes the project staff facilitated the elections in which communities elected their 
representatives to be involved in the REDD+ activities, i.e., each individual village formed 
two committees namely, village natural resources committees and village land use 
committees. Of which one third of committee members are women. 
     Following national policy frameworks, TFCG and MJUMITA through participatory processes 
of land use planning and forest resource assessments, each individual village studied had 
demarcated their respective village forest reserves, and subsequently established community-
based forest management as REDD+ regime, i.e., established village land use plans and 
forest management plans and corresponding by-laws containing rules and sanctions. 
Moreover, they have established REDD+ by-laws― as village level REDD+ rules which will 
govern distribution of REDD+ benefits. Note that in relation to the village level REDD+ by-
laws—MJUMITA carbon enterprise is also established, i.e., institutionalized through the 
REDD+ by-laws. As alluded to earlier, the MJUMITA carbon enterprise as a service provider 
to these communities will aggregate REDD+ carbon credits generated from their village 
forest reserves, market and sell them to buyers in the voluntary carbon markets, and manage 
and distribute accrued revenues based on the above rules. 
      However, although communities accepted the implementation of the project interventions, 
and also elected their representatives to be involved in the decision-making processes noted 
above, there are couple of issues especially concerning the legitimacy of these committees 
and perhaps on the decisions they have made. As indicated, only 21 % of those eligible to 
make decisions participated in the FPIC process as well as in the elections process. In other 
words these processes were characterized by lack of effective participation and 
representation, for example on the issue of decision-making processes such as demarcating 
and allocating land, there are concerns that decisions made are likely to exacerbate ongoing 
conflict between farmers mainly involved in the REDD+ activities and pastoralists― hence 
undermining the sustainability of the project efforts being made on the ground.  
      For communities participating in the project, however, one may assume that interventions of 
the REDD+ project such land use planning and expected village land certificates will 
possibly guarantee secured tenure rights, as well as address other existing social conflicts 
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mainly related to village land boundaries, hence addressing the legitimacy concerns. 
Moreover, these interventions create the basis for sustainable resource use and 
management―preconditions for the fully functioning MJUMITA Carbon Enterprise which is 
expected to provide financial incentives from sales of the REDD+ carbon credits generated 
by these communities, and additional co-benefits including income generating schemes. 
      Furthermore, the Kilosa REDD+ project has focused on creating capacities through training 
of the district personnel and community leaders on governance issues, particularly on the 
linkage between PFM, leakage and REDD+. In the case of village leaders― village 
governments are trained on management skills in view of preparing them how best they 
should use awaited REDD+ benefits. Besides they are supported to have good working 
environment and improved service delivery through the construction of their offices which 
will also be shared with village land registration office, and newly established community-
based organizations.  
      Furthermore, as part of the leakage mitigation plans and general awareness, REDD+ project 
have trained primary teachers on environmental issues, as well as participating communities 
on the use of improved cooking stoves; and awareness campaigns on forest fires. In line with 
this, farmers have also been organized and trained on improved farming techniques to 
increase the productivity of their land through agricultural extension services provided by the 
agricultural officer of the project. 
      Finally, the project has established internal monitoring and evaluation system to track 
periodical performance indicators spelled out in the project design document and potential 
risks, as part of the contractual obligations. As noted, in terms of establishing MRV system 
for the project― this process was still in its initial stages due to the challenges involved, 
including lack of technical capacity which had to be created through training. This concerns 
establishing the project baselines consistent with both the VCS and CCB procedures. 
      How cost-effective is TFCG/MJUMITA model
20
 then? 
      The above question concerns the second objective of this study which aimed to generate 
knowledge about the level and structure of the transaction costs for establishing governance 
structure for the Kilosa REDD+ pilot project. The results on the research questions that have 
been used to structure the analysis are as under: 
                                                     
20
 Pro-poor model 
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Following Vatn (Unpublished) perspectives on TCs in the REDD+ pilot areas. This study 
defines transaction costs (TCs) as the resources incurred by actors involved in the processes 
of establishing the aforementioned governance structure for the REDD+ pilot project along 
the following functions: General planning and administration costs, the FPIC process costs, 
institutions building costs, and genera administration and accountancy costs. 
 
Thus, the first research question was to find out the level of costs per function and actors 
involved. 
 
The results indicate that total TCs of setting up governance structure for the Kilosa REDD+ 
pilot project are estimated at about USD $ 1,331,281. The results further suggest that, TCs by 
function and actors range from 2 percent to 68 percent of total TCs. Of the total TCs, the 
highest costs along functions are associated with the costs of general planning and 
administration (68%) ― mainly because of fixed costs, i.e., personnel and office costs. When 
the general planning and administration costs are combined with the costs of general 
administration and accountancy (i.e., costs of support personnel) ― they account for about 77 
% of the total TCs. The remainder, i.e., 21 % represents the costs associated with the process 
of setting up institutions and ongoing MRV system on the ground; and finally 2 % represent 
costs related to the FPIC process respectively. 
 
The second research question was to find out total TCs by cost categories and actors involved 
in the process of setting up governance structure for the Kilosa REDD+ pilot project. 
 
The results indicate that the overall costs of setting up governance structure for the Kilosa 
pilot project are mainly borne by the REDD+ project. As such, total costs by cost categories 
falling upon actors range from nearly zero percent to 43 percent of the total TCs. The 43 
percent of total TCs include personnel costs, office costs, travel costs, and depreciation and 
maintenance costs for both TFCG and MJUMITA head office. Field personnel costs and 
office costs account for 30 percent of total TCs. Consultancy account for 14 percent of total 
TCs; 6 percent as the allowance costs for district surveyor; and 7 per cent as the costs for 
training and allowances for village councils and community organizations involved in the 
decision-making processes respectively. 
 
Lastly, the lower cost share of about 0.4 per cent of total TCs represent opportunity cost of 
villager’s involvement in the FPIC process. As explained, the reason for this is that villager’s 
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engagement in the REDD+ activities beyond FPIC process is limited to their representation. 
It is worth noting that, much as this could be argued or seen as a good strategy, i.e., in terms 
of reducing costs on either sides― there is possibility of insufficient knowledge among 
villagers about the REDD+ related issues, including decisions being taken― this situation 
creates potential risks of elite capture as lack of transparency and accountability might be an 
issue when REDD+ money starts flowing. 
 
The final research question was to adjust total TCs on per hectare of forests protected, as well 
as per ton of carbon dioxide as expected. Based on initial estimates of forest area to be 
protected by 2014, the findings from this study suggest that TCs per hectare of protected 
forests are about USD $ 21/ha of total TCs. In terms of per ton of carbon dioxide as expected 
the results suggest about USD $ 0.4tCO2/ha of total TCs. 
 
However, as emphasized the costs captured in this study are in fact underestimated, 
particularly those costs associated with general planning and administration due to several 
limitations I discussed earlier. Moreover, much as this study has tried to consider all village 
costs estimate, i.e., based on the costs of 4 villages it appears that village level costs could 
increase, as a result of extra costs related to the processes of setting up conclusive village 
level payments system
21
, as well as creation of additional committees which will handle the 
distribution of REDD+ benefits.  
 
To sum up, despite the underestimated costs presented herein, the findings from this study 
enables one to question the capacity of MJUMITA carbon enterprise as self-financed entity 
will have to scale up the same interventions above— in order to efficiently deal with potential 
offsite risks of leakage given the current forest area of the project. Even within the project 
area, i.e., considering the estimated village forest reserves (i.e., 64,000 ha) and the size of 
forest that will be under the so called sustainable management (i.e., about 15,000 ha) — it is 
clear that the challenges and risks because of pressure on these forests and overall non-
compliance to the established forest management rules seem inevitable.  
 
Specifically, given the financial projections of the Kilosa REDD+ project, and subsequent 
estimated of REDD+ household payments, which already fall short of expectations compared 
to the current household opportunity cost of shifting cultivation— it appears that it will be 
difficult if not impossible for the MJUMITA carbon enterprise to effectively raise enough 
                                                     
21
 After 1
st
 trial payments 
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resource to deliver or achieve the stated goal, i.e., ‘making REDD work for communities and 
forest in Tanzania’. The stated goal is to demonstrate additionality not only in reduced 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, but also on REDD+ co-benefits 
including protection of biodiversity and improved social and economic conditions of the 
participating communities based on the baselines yet to be known,  as well sustaining them at 
least within the designed period of the project (30 years). 
 
6.2. Recommendations 
      The study recommends that based on the challenges and risks mentioned above, it is realistic 
for the stated overall goal of the project to be treated as an assumption. The study further 
provides recommendations for further studies. It is expected that the analysis of full costs of 
establishing REDD+ in Kilosa will be done in two phases, thus for the purpose of the next 
round of transaction costs analysis― the study recommends the following: 
- As emphasized, general planning and administration costs are underestimated in this 
study due to the limitations I explained, thus the following costs should be fully 
covered: It seems there is now more understanding of the motives behind the study of 
TCs, since the initial attempts of getting data related to the process of contract 
negotiation incurred by TFCG was not successful― as the CEO of TFCG argued that 
these costs were not readily available
22—  I suggest that next study should try and see 
if the data could be obtained,  perhaps the internalized costs could be ascertained by 
now. Further, as noted earlier attention also should be given to the costs related to the 
MRV set up processes. 
 
- Concerning village level costs, the study recommends that public costs be covered, 
i.e., the costs associated with decision- making processes at district level. I suggest 
also that when looking at village level costs, let say for village 5 and so on, more 
attention is needed on the costs associated with the processes of establishing village 
level payments system, as well as EDD+ special committees― which as I understand 
were formed to handle the distribution of REDD+ benefits. It is unclear to me if these 
committees are different from village natural resource committees and MJUMITA 
local networks.   
 
                                                     
22
Though added that were internalized.    
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         Appendix 1 
 
List of Capital assets and equipment ($) 
 
  
                  Items   TFCG MJUMITA  SUM 
Capital assets         
- Vehicles    94,481 74,576 169,057 
- Motor cycles  22,901 11,136 34,037 
Total   117,382 85,712 203,094 
Office equipment       
- Laptops   6,997 1,620 8,617 
- Printers   2,820   2,820 
- Photocopier   4,890   4,890 
- Digital cameras 2,112   2,112 
- Power point projector 1,595   1,595 
Total   18,414 1,620 20,034 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
